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Abstract
A committee ranks a set of alternatives by sequentially voting on
pairs, in an order chosen by the committee’s chair. Although the chair
has no knowledge of voters’ preferences, we show that she can do as
well as if she had perfect information. We characterise strategies with
this ‘regret-freeness’ property in two ways: (1) they are efficient, and
(2) they avoid two intuitive errors. One regret-free strategy is a sorting
algorithm called insertion sort. We show that it is characterised by a
lexicographic property, and is outcome-equivalent to a recursive variant
of the much-studied amendment procedure.
1 Introduction
A committee is tasked with ranking a set of alternatives. This could be a
hiring committee deciding to which candidate a job should be offered, to
whom next if the first candidate declines, and so on. Or it could be the
leadership of a political party drawing up its party list: if the party wins
K parliamentary seats in the subsequent election, these will go to the K
highest-ranked candidates.
One pair of alternatives is considered at a time, with a majority vote
determining which is to be ranked higher. Transitivity is enforced: once the
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committee has ranked x above y and y above z, x is considered ranked above
z.1 Pairwise voting continues until the alternatives are fully ranked.
The order in which pairs of alternatives are considered—the agenda—is
chosen by the committee’s chair. The chair has a (strict) preference  over
alternatives, and we assume that she prefers rankings that are unambiguously
more aligned with .2 In the hiring application, with uncertainty about which
candidates would accept an offer, a more aligned ranking is exactly one that
hires a weakly -better candidate in every state of the world.3 The chair has
no knowledge of how voters will behave. How should she set the agenda, and
how much influence can she exert?
Fix how each voter votes on each pair of alternatives. Write x W y if
a majority favour x in a vote on {x, y}; we call W the general will. Since
the general will is all that matters to the chair, we work with W directly.
This makes our analysis invariant to institutional details: extensions like
super-majority rules or abstentions merely alter W . The ‘general will’ need
not even arise from voting: another interpretation is that the chair is an
advisor to a leader with expressed will W .
A strategy specifies what pair of alternatives to offer a vote on after each
history.4 Call a ranking of alternatives W -feasible if some strategy achieves
it under general will W , and W -unimprovable if there is no other ranking
that is both W -feasible and unambiguously more aligned with . The chair
could do no better than a W -unimprovable ranking even if she had perfect
knowledge of the general will W .
The chair does not know the general will. A regret-free strategy is one
that reaches a W -unimprovable ranking under every W . Were a regret-free
strategy to exist, it would allow the chair to reach ex-post unimprovable
outcomes. Surprisingly, regret-free strategies do exist: we show in Theorem 1
that a sorting algorithm called insertion sort is regret-free.
What other strategies are regret-free? We provide two characterisations.
For the first, call a ranking W -efficient if it ranks x above y whenever both
x  y and x W y (i.e. the chair and the general will agree). Theorem 2
asserts that regret-free strategies are precisely those that reach a W -efficient
1To turn the (possibly cyclic) majority will into a (transitive) ranking, some pairs of
alternatives must be ranked by fiat. The described rule is the only one satisfying committee
sovereignty: each alternative is ranked above those that it beat in a vote.
2A ranking R is (unambiguously) more aligned with  than another ranking R′ if for
any pair of alternatives x  y, if R′ ranks x above y, then so does R.
3Thus the chair prefers more aligned rankings if she has e.g. expected-utility preferences.
Similarly in the party lists application, for every k ≤ K, the kth -best candidate who
gets a seat is weakly -better under a more aligned ranking.
4A history records what pairs were voted on, and which alternative won each vote.
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ranking under each general will W .5
Our second characterisation delineates two intuitive errors that regret-free
strategies avoid. For the first error, consider three alternatives x  y  z,
such that y has already been ranked above z. If the chair offers {x, y} for a
vote and it goes her way (x W y), then she gets x ranked above z ‘for free’
as a consequence of transitivity. Thus offering a vote on {x, z} misses an
opportunity for a ‘favourable imposition of transitivity’.6
For the second error, consider three alternatives x, y, z such that the chair
prefers x to both y and z, and y has already been ranked below z. Offering
{x, y} takes a risk in that if the vote goes badly (y W x), then not only
will x be ranked below y, but x will be ranked below z—an ‘unfavourable
imposition of transitivity’.
Theorem 3 states that regret-free strategies are precisely those that
never miss an opportunity or take a risk. Our advice to the chair is thus to,
(separately) in each period, offer any pair that does not constitute an error
of either kind.7 Insertion sort is one way of doing this.
What is special about insertion sort? We show in Theorem 4 that it is
characterised by a ‘lexicographic’ property: among all strategies, it optimises
the position of the chair’s favourite alternative; among such strategies, it
optimises the position of the her second-favourite alternative; and so on.
The insertion-sort strategy can also be described in terms of the amend-
ment procedure, which is used by many legislatures and has been extensively
studied in the literature (see §1.1 below for references). This procedure offers
a vote on the chair’s two least-favourite alternatives, then pits the winner
against her third-least favourite, then pits the winner against her fourth-
least favourite, and so on.8 The recursive-amendment procedure runs the
amendment procedure to obtain a top-ranked alternative y1, then runs the
amendment procedure on all alternatives but y1 to obtain a second-ranked
alternative y2, then again on all alternatives but y1 and y2, and so on. We
establish in Proposition 3 that recursive amendment offers the same votes as
insertion sort (albeit in a different order), so that the two produce the same
final ranking under each general will W .
5This characterisation is tight: for any general will W , every W -feasible W -efficient
ranking is reached by some regret-free strategy (Proposition 1).
6This can hurt: if z W x W y W z, then missing this opportunity leads x to be ranked
below z, whereas it would have been ranked above had {x, y} been offered.
7When no errors have been committed, there is always a non-error pair that can be
offered next (Proposition 2).
8In the literature, the amendment procedure is defined given some ordering of the
alternatives. In our definition, that ordering is the chair’s preference .
3
Our analysis assumes history-invariant voting, so that whether x W y
or y W x is independent of what has happened so far. This assumption is
satisfied if voting is expressive or if voters are unsophisticated. When voting
is strategic, we provide a rationale for sincere (a fortiori history-invariant)
voting in Proposition 4: the sincere-voting strategy is uniquely dominant,
meaning that any other strategy fails to be obviously better against every
profile of strategies of the chair and other voters, and is obviously worse
against some profile. By ‘obviously better’, we mean that the final ranking is
unambiguously more aligned with the voter’s preference over alternatives.
1.1 Related literature
We contribute to the agenda-manipulation literature initiated by Black (1958)
and Farquharson (1969), which asks how a committee’s choice can be in-
fluenced by varying the order in which binary questions are voted on (the
agenda). Two classes of agenda are emphasised: the amendment procedure
used in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian legislatures, and the successive pro-
cedure widely used in continental Europe. Under complete information, for
both sincere and strategic voting, Miller (1977) and Banks (1985) characterise
which alternatives an agenda-setter can induce a committee to choose using (i)
amendment agendas, (ii) successive agendas, and (iii) arbitrary agendas.9,10
Extensions include super- and sub-majority voting rules (Barberà & Gerber,
2017) and random agendas (Roessler, Shelegia & Strulovici, 2018).
Specifically, this paper belongs to the literature on agenda-setting un-
der incomplete information about voters’ preferences. This literature long
consisted of a single pioneering paper (Ordeshook & Palfrey, 1988), but has
recently received interest from Kleiner and Moldovanu (2017), Gershkov,
Moldovanu and Shi (2017, 2019a, 2019b) and Gershkov, Kleiner, Moldovanu
and Shi (2019). We depart from these papers by considering a committee
tasked not with choosing a single alternative, but rather with ranking all
of the alternatives. We establish a link with the older literature by showing
that the amendment procedure forms the basis of a regret-free strategy.
Also related is the social choice literature on ranking methods, meaning
maps that assign to each (possibly cyclic) general will a (transitive) ranking.
‘Impossibility’ results such as Arrow’s (1950, 1951, 1963) theorem assert that
9Part (i) under strategic voting due to Banks (1985); the rest are from Miller (1977).
See Myerson (1991, §4.10) for a nice textbook treatment of (iii) under strategic voting.
10Related work by Apesteguia, Ballester and Masatlioglu (2014) and Horan (2020)
axiomatises the decision rules (which specify a choice for each choice set and preference
profile) defined by various agendas under strategic voting.
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certain normatively appealing properties are inconsistent. The literature
beginning with Zermelo (1929), Wei (1952) and Kendall (1955) studies
ranking methods with at least some attractive normative properties.11 Our
chair’s problem can be formulated as a choice among ranking methods. But
there is a feasibility constraint: only ranking methods induced by some
strategy are available.12 Furthermore, the objective captures the chair’s
self-interest, not any normative notion. This suggests that the solutions to
our chair’s problem will bear little relation to the normatively-motivated
ranking methods studied in the literature. We confirm this in supplemental
appendix M.
We assume that the chair prefers one ranking to another whenever the
former is more aligned with her preference over alternatives. This is an
instance of single-crossing dominance, a general way of comparing rankings.
In a separate paper (Curello & Sinander, 2019), we study its lattice structure.
Regret-based criteria for evaluating strategies appear in decision theory,
including minimax regret (Savage, 1951) and ‘regret theory’ (Bell, 1982;
Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Fishburn, 1983). The online learning literature
(Gordon, 1999; Zinkevich, 2003) studies (asymptotic) regret-freeness.
1.2 Roadmap
We describe the environment and basic concepts in §2. In §3, we introduce
efficiency and show that it implies regret-freeness. We next (§4) define the
insertion-sort strategy, and show that it is efficient (Theorem 1), hence regret-
free. In §5, we characterise regret-freeness in terms of efficiency (Theorem 2)
and error-avoidance (Theorem 3), and show that both characterisations are
tight (Propositions 1 and 2). In §6, we show that insertion sort is characterised
by a lexicographic property (Theorem 4) and that it is outcome-equivalent to
recursive amendment (Proposition 3). Finally, we establish in §7 that sincere
voting is dominant (Proposition 4).
11For example, Copeland’s (1951) method (Rubinstein, 1980), the Kemeny–Slater method
(Kemeny, 1959; Slater, 1961; Young & Levenglick, 1978; Young, 1986, 1988) and the fair-
bets method (Daniels, 1969; Moon & Pullman, 1970; Slutzki & Volij, 2005). See Charon
and Hudry (2010) and González-Díaz, Hendrick and Lohmann (2014) for an overview.
12The ranking method induced by a strategy is the one that assigns to each W the
outcome (final ranking) of that strategy under W .
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2 Environment
There is a finite set X of alternatives. We are concerned with rankings of
alternatives, formalised as follows:
Definition 1. A proto-ranking is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation
on X . A ranking is a proto-ranking that is total.13
Given a (proto-)ranking R and alternatives x, y ∈ X , x R y reads ‘x
is ranked above y according to R’. Proto-rankings are to be thought of as
incomplete rankings.
There is a committee of voters i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, where I ∈ N is odd, and
the committee’s chair. The committee meets to determine a ranking, with
the chair in charge of the agenda. Three applications are as follows.
Hiring. The alternatives X are candidates for a job. Only some unknown
subset X ⊆ X of candidates would accept the job if offered it. The hiring
committee decides the order in which offers should be made (a ranking): the
job is offered to the first candidate, then to the second if the first declined,
and so on. It suffices for the committee to meet once, as is natural if meetings
are costly or impractical. Alternatively, the committee could re-convene every
time a candidate turns down an offer, taking just enough decisions in each
meeting to identify the next candidate to whom an offer will be made.14
Relabelling, we may instead think of the alternatives as investment
projects of unknown viability. A firm’s board (or a lower-level committee)
ranks the projects, whereupon a manager evaluates the first project (e.g. by
commissioning market research) and implements it if viable, and otherwise
evaluates the second project and implements that if viable, and so on.
Similarly, the committee could be a policy-making body, such as a min-
isterial cabinet or a parliamentary committee. Any given policy may turn
out to be infeasible, for example due to a court ruling or political opposition.
The committee therefore ranks the policies and tasks a bureaucrat with
implementing the first policy if feasible, the second if not, and so on.
Party lists. A political party’s leadership committee must draw up a party
list, meaning a ranking of the party’s parliamentary candidates X . The K top-
ranked candidates will earn parliamentary seats, where K is the (uncertain)
number of seats won by the party in a subsequent election.
13Definitions of some order-theoretic terms are collected in appendix A.
14This is natural when the committee wishes to decide as little as possible prior to each
job offer. The recursive amendment procedure studied in §6.3 is attractive in this case: it
quickly determines what candidate is ranked first (allowing an offer to be made), then (if
necessary) quickly identifies the second-highest-ranked, and so on.
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Electoral systems of this type, called party-list proportional representa-
tion, are used in most of the world’s democracies. More precisely, we described
the closed-list variant that gives voters no sway over party lists; this system
is used in several dozen states.15 Other countries allow the electorate to
influence party lists.16 In many of these, voters exert little influence on party
lists in practice,17 making the closed-list system a reasonable idealisation.
We may re-interpret this as a firm planning for downsizing. The firm will
have to fire an uncertain number K of its workers X . The board (or a lower-
level committee) plans ahead by drawing up an order in which employees
will (if necessary) be let go.
2.1 Interaction
The committee collectively determines a ranking R as follows. Initially, no
alternatives are ranked. In each period, the chair offers a vote on a pair of
alternatives. The committee votes, and whichever alternative garners more
votes wins. (The chair does not have a vote.) The winning alternative is
ranked above the losing one. In addition, transitivity is imposed: if x is
ranked above y and y above z, then x is considered ranked above z. The
chair offers votes until all alternatives are ranked.
More formally, the interaction is as follows. For each period t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , },
a proto-ranking Rt describes what has been decided by the end of period t:
x Rt y if x has been ranked above y, and x 6Rt y otherwise. Initially, nothing
has been decided: R0 = ∅. In each period t ∈ N, unless Rt−1 is already total,
(1) The chair offers for a vote an unranked pair of alternatives: namely
distinct x, y ∈ X with x 6Rt−1 y 6Rt−1 x.
(2) Each voter i ∈ {1, . . . , I} votes for either x or y. Whichever alternative
garners more (fewer) votes is said to win (lose).
(3) The winner is ranked above the loser, and transitivity is imposed: if
(say) x won, then Rt is the transitive closure of Rt−1 ∪ {(x, y)}.18
15For example, Argentina, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.
16E.g. Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, the Netherlands and Ukraine.
17In many countries, such as Indonesia and the Netherlands, the party’s list is only
altered if a candidate receives a large number of personal votes. Furthermore, voting
for an individual candidate is typically optional, and most voters do not. (In Swedish
parliamentary elections, only about a quarter do (Oscarsson, 2019).) Of course there
are exceptions: voting for individual candidates is mandatory and important in Finnish
parliamentary elections, for example.
18Equivalently, z Rt w iff either (1) z Rt−1 w, or (2) both (a) z = x or z Rt−1 x and (b)
y = w or y Rt−1 w. See appendix D.1 (Observation 3, p. 31) for a proof of equivalence.
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The interaction ends when Rt is total, hence a ranking. We often write T for
the period in which this occurs, and R = RT for the final ranking.
To understand why we assume that transitivity is imposed in this manner,
observe that the purpose of the interaction is to turn the will of the majority,
which may contain (Condorcet) cycles, into a (by definition transitive) ranking.
Some pairs will thus necessarily be ranked by fiat. We require that transitivity
be imposed immediately after each vote because this is necessary and sufficient
for committee sovereignty, the requirement that x be ranked above y if x
beat y in a vote.19 Indeed, we contend that the protocol described above is
the only natural one, given that the interaction must end with a ranking: as
shown in supplemental appendix H, any other protocol must violate either
committee sovereignty or democratic legitimacy, the requirement that the
chair offer enough votes to give the committee a fair say.
A history is a sequence of pairs offered for a vote and a winner of each
vote. A strategy specifies what pair to offer for a vote after each history. We
give formal versions of these definitions in appendix B.1.
Remark 1. A history records only which alternative in each pair wins,
rather than the full vote tally. Our definition of a strategy therefore rules
out conditioning on who voted how in the past.20 This is merely to avoid
uninteresting complications: we show in supplemental appendix K that our
results hold for ‘extended strategies’ that can condition on past votes cast.
2.2 The general will
The chair need not keep track of individual votes: all that matters for each
pair of alternatives is which one wins. This essential information is captured
by the binary relation W such that x W y iff a majority of voters vote for x
over y when the pair {x, y} is offered. We call W the general will.21
By using the general will, we implicitly assume history-invariance: x W y
means that x garners a majority over y at any history at which {x, y} is offered.
We must therefore suppose that voters’ behaviour is (at least approximately)
history-invariant. This is reasonable if voters are non-strategic: if they are
unsophisticated, say, or vote ‘expressively’ (to please their constituents,
for example). Empirically, non-strategic voting appears to be the norm in
19Sufficiency is obvious. For necessity, suppose the chair were allowed to offer {x, z} even
though x Rt−1 y Rt−1 z; then committee sovereignty is violated whenever z beats x.
20Of course, this is only a restriction if the chair can observe individual votes.
21Our use of this term is inspired by Rousseau (1755a, 1755b, 1762). Although there is a
long tradition of using the term in this way, it probably isn’t quite what Rousseau meant.
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many important institutions, such as the US Congress.22 Even if voters
behave strategically, we argue in §7 that it is not unreasonable to assume
history-invariant voting.
Definition 2. A tournament is a total and asymmetric relation on X .
Only tournaments can be general wills, since for any pair of alternatives,
one wins and the other loses. In fact, all and only tournaments are the general
will of some committee, as we show in appendix B.2. We therefore study the
chair’s problem for an arbitrary tournament W .
Remark 2. An alternative interpretation of our model is that there is a single
individual with (expressed) preference W . We can think of this individual as
a leader, and of the chair as his crafty advisor.23 Intransitivities in W reflect
inconsistencies in the leader’s judgement. The advisor manipulates the leader
by asking him to make pairwise comparisons in a well-chosen order.
Remark 3. Varying the committee’s rules merely gives rise to a different
general will, leaving the analysis below applicable without modification. For
example, we can accommodate a super-majority voting rule (with the size
of the required super-majority possibly varying across pairs of alternatives),
an even electorate I ∈ N, and abstentions. We need only specify which
alternative wins in case of an indecisive vote (meaning one in which neither
wins the required (super-)majority), for example by assuming that there is a
status quo ranking that prevails in such cases.
A more substantial variation is to permit the chair (sometimes) to decide
how {x, y} are to be ranked following an indecisive vote on them. This
happens if the chair has a vote, for example. We extend all of our results to
allow for this in supplemental appendix J.
The outcome of a strategy under a tournament W is the ranking that
results. If a history is visited by a strategy σ under some tournament, we
say that it belongs to the path of σ. We give formal definitions of outcomes
and paths in appendix B.1.
2.3 W -feasible rankings
A W -feasible ranking is one that is reachable ex post: had the chair known
that the general will was W , then she could have attained such a ranking by
offering some sequence of pairs.
22See Landha (1994), Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Wilkerson (1999), as well as the
survey by Groseclose and Milyo (2010).
23For example, Henry VIII and Cardinal Wolsey, or Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu.
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Definition 3. Given a tournament W , a ranking is W -feasible iff it is the
outcome under W of some strategy of the chair.
Example 1. There are three alternatives X = {1, 2, 3}, and the general will
satisfies 1 W 3 W 2 W 1. Graphically:
1
23
The ranking 2 R 1 R 3 is W -feasible, achieved by offering {1, 2} and {1, 3}.
Similarly, 1 R′ 3 R′ 2 and 3 R′′ 2 R′′ 1 are W -feasible.
2.4 The chair’s preferences
The chair has a strict preference (formally: a ranking) over the alternatives
X , denoted . We do not fully specify the chair’s preferences over rankings.
We assume only that she prefers a ranking over another whenever the former
is more aligned with her own preference over alternatives.
Definition 4. For rankings , R and R′, we say that R is more aligned
with  than R′ iff for any pair x, y ∈ X of alternatives with x  y, if x R′ y
then also x R y.
In words, whenever a pair x, y ∈ X is ranked ‘right’ by R′ (viz. x  y and
x R′ y), it is also ranked ‘right’ by R (i.e. x R y). The definition is illustrated
in Figure 1 for the case of three alternatives.
We assume that if R is more aligned with  than R′, then the chair
weakly prefers R to R′. We view this as a minimal notion of consistency
between the chair’s preference over alternatives and her preference over
rankings of alternatives. It has natural meaning in the applications:
Hiring (continued). Recall that the top-ranked candidate in X will be hired,
where X ⊆ X is unknown. A ranking is more aligned with  exactly if it
hires a weakly -better candidate at every realisation of the uncertainty X,
as we show in appendix B.4. Thus any reasonable preferences over rankings
favour more aligned rankings. In particular, R is preferred to R′ by all
expected-utility preferences consistent with  iff R is more aligned with .
Party lists (continued). Recall that the K highest-ranked candidates earn
parliamentary seats, where K is uncertain. Say that a ranking R dominates
another ranking R′ iff for any K and k ≤ K, the kth -best candidate who
10
1 R 2 R 3
2 R 1 R 3
2 R 3 R 1
3 R 2 R 1
3 R 1 R 2
1 R 3 R 2
Figure 1 – ‘More aligned with  than’ for three alternatives X = {1, 2, 3},
where 1  2  3. In this (‘Hasse’) diagram, there is a directed path from one
ranking to another iff the former is more aligned with .
wins a seat under R is weakly -better than the kth -best under R′. Clearly
any reasonable preferences over rankings will favour a dominating ranking.
We show in appendix B.4 that ‘more aligned with  than’ implies dominance,
and that it is also necessary provided there is (at least some) uncertainty
about which candidates can take up seats.24
2.5 Regret-free strategies
Suppose the chair were to know the general will W . Then she could reach all
and only W -feasible rankings, so would choose one that is W -unimprovable:
Definition 5. Given a tournament W , a ranking is W -unimprovable iff
there is no other W -feasible ranking that is more aligned with .
Remark 4. A ranking R is W -unimprovable precisely if for any W -feasible
ranking R′ 6= R, there is some pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X that R ranks
‘right’ (x  y and x R y) and that R′ ranks ‘wrong’ (y R′ x).
W -unimprovability is the strongest optimality concept available without
further assumptions about the chair’s preference over rankings. It can there-
fore be thought of as optimality for a chair who is unable to make fine
comparisons between rankings (which are complicated objects). Were we
to fully specify the chair’s preference over rankings, we could still break
24A party cannot alter its list after submitting it, but circumstances may render some of
its candidates ineligible for parliamentary seats. For example, many countries disqualify
candidates convicted of a serious crime, and all disqualify the deceased.
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her problem under full information about W into two parts: first, reach the
frontier (W -unimprovability), then choose among the frontier rankings.
Hiring (continued). A ranking R is W -unimprovable exactly if any W -
feasible ranking R′ 6= R hires a strictly -worse candidate at some realisation
X ⊆ X of uncertainty.
Remark 5. W -unimprovability is a non-trivial property only if there are
W -feasible rankings that are not W -unimprovable. We show in supplemental
appendix I that this is the case whenever W contains a (Condorcet) cycle,
and that for a typical W , most W -feasible rankings are not W -unimprovable.
The chair does not know the general will. One would therefore expect her
to face trade-offs: a strategy that does well against W may have a regrettable
outcome under some W ′. A regret-free strategy is one that has no such
downside: its outcome under any general will is unimprovable ex post.
Definition 6. A strategy is regret-free iff for any tournamentW , its outcome
under W is W -unimprovable.
Regret-freeness is a highly demanding optimality property. Surprisingly,
however, regret-free strategies exist: we show in §4 that a strategy called
insertion sort is regret-free (Theorem 1). We then provide two characterisa-
tions of regret-freeness (§5, Theorems 2 and 3). To develop these results, we
require a new concept: efficiency.
3 Efficiency
An efficient strategy is one that never wastes a consensus: whenever the
chair and the general will agree on a pair of alternatives, they are ranked
accordingly. In this section, we introduce efficiency and show that it implies
regret-freeness. We shall use this result in §4 to prove that insertion sort
is regret-free (Theorem 1). We obtain the converse (regret-freeness implies
efficiency) in §5 (Theorem 2).
3.1 W -efficient rankings
A W -efficient ranking is one that, whenever the chair and committee agree
on a pair of alternatives, ranks them accordingly:
Definition 7. Given a tournament W , a ranking R is W -efficient iff for any
pair x, y ∈ X of alternatives with x  y and x W y, we have x R y.
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W -efficient rankings exist trivially, since the chair’s preference  is a
W -efficient ranking for any tournament W .
Example 1 (continued). Recall the details from p. 10, and let the chair’s
preference be 1  2  3. W -efficiency requires precisely that 1 be ranked
above 3. There are three such rankings:  itself, 2 R 1 R 3 and 1 R′ 3 R′ 2.
In Example 1, the W -efficient ranking  is not W -feasible. But the
other two W -efficient rankings, R and R′, are both W -feasible. In fact, any
tournament W admits at least one W -feasible W -efficient ranking.25
3.2 W -efficiency and W -unimprovability
W -efficiency is a useful property because it implies W -unimprovability:
Lemma 1. For any tournamentW , aW -efficient ranking isW -unimprovable.
Proof. Fix a tournament W , and let R be a W -efficient ranking. To establish
that R is W -unimprovable, assume toward a contradiction that some W -
feasible ranking R′ 6= R is more aligned with  than R.
Since R′ 6= R, there are alternatives x, y ∈ X such that x R′ y and y R x.
Enumerate the alternatives that R′ ranks between x and y as
x = z1 R′ z2 R′ · · · R′ zN = y.
Since R′ is W -feasible, we must have zm W zm+1 for each m < N . (This
follows from Observation 1 in appendix B.3 (p. 27).) There has to be an n < N
at which zn+1 R zn, since otherwise we would have x R y by transitivity of
R. And it must be that zn+1  zn, because otherwise the W -efficiency of R
would require that zn R zn+1. Thus the pair (zn, zn+1) is ranked ‘right’ by
R (zn+1  zn and zn+1 R zn) and ‘wrong’ by R′ (zn R′ zn+1), contradicting
the hypothesis that R′ is more aligned with  than R. 
The converse of Lemma 1 is false whenever there are |X | ≥ 4 alternatives:
a W -unimprovable ranking can easily fail to be W -efficient. We shall see an
example of this in §5.1 (p. 17).
3.3 Efficient strategies
An efficient strategy is one whose outcomes are efficient:
25This follows from Theorem 1 in §4.1 below; a direct proof is also possible.
13
Definition 8. A strategy is efficient iff for any tournament W , its outcome
under W is W -efficient.
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 1, we obtain:
Corollary 1. Any efficient strategy is regret-free.
Since the converse of Lemma 1 is false, one might expect the converse of
Corollary 1 also to be false. But it is true, as we shall see in §5 (Theorem 2).
4 Insertion sort
In this section, we introduce the insertion-sort strategy.We show in Theorem 1
(§4.2) that it is efficient, and hence regret-free by Corollary 1. This establishes
in particular that regret-free strategies exist.
4.1 The insertion-sort strategy
Insertion-sort algorithm. Label the alternatives X ≡ {1, . . . , n} so that
1  · · ·  n. First, pit n− 1 against n. Then set k = n− 2, and repeat the
following while k ≥ 1:
– Alternatives {k+1, . . . , n} have already been totally ranked. Label them
accordingly: {xk+1, . . . , xn} ≡ {k + 1, . . . , n}, where xk+1 R · · · R xn.
– Pit k against xk+1, the highest-ranked alternative in {k + 1, . . . , n}.
If k won, then {k, . . . , n} is now totally ranked as k R xk+1 R · · ·xn.
– If k lost to xk+1, pit k against xk+2, the second-highest-ranked.
If k won, then {k, . . . , n} is totally ranked: xk+1 R k R xk+2 R · · ·xn.
– If k lost also to xk+2, pit k against xk+3.
If k won, then {k, . . . , n} is now totally ranked.
. . .
– Now {k, . . . , n} is totally ranked.
Decrease k by 1 and repeat.
Insertion sort is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case of three alternatives.
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R = ∅
↪→ offer {2, 3}
2 R 3
↪→ offer {1, 2}
3 R 2
↪→ offer {1, 3}
1 R 2 R 3
2 R 1 & 2 R 3
↪→ offer {1, 3} 1 R 3 R 2
3 R 1 & 3 R 2
↪→ offer {1, 2}
2 R 1 R 3 2 R 3 R 1 3 R 1 R 2 3 R 2 R 1
2 W 3 3 W 2
1 W 2 2 W 1 1 W 3 3 W 1
1 W 3 3 W 1 1 W 2 2 W 1
Figure 2 – The insertion-sort algorithm with three alternatives X = {1, 2, 3},
where the chair’s preference is 1  2  3. R denotes the (evolving) proto-
ranking. The path taken depends on the general will W .
Remark 6. Insertion sort is a standard sorting algorithm—see e.g. Knuth
(1998, §5.2.1). The relationship with sorting is as follows. By a list, we
mean exactly a ranking. Call W the ‘comparator’, and assume that it is
transitive. A sorting algorithm takes as input an ‘unsorted’ list , performs
pairwise comparisons using W , and outputs a list R that is ‘sorted’, meaning
that R = W . The term ‘insertion’ stems from the fact that for each k ∈
{1, . . . , n − 1}, the algorithm first sorts (fully ranks) {k + 1, . . . , n}, then
‘inserts’ k into {k + 1, . . . , n} by comparing it with the highest-ranked, then
the second-highest-ranked, and so on until k’s place is found.
To operationalise insertion sort, we use a strategy whose on-path be-
haviour is described by the algorithm. The details of its definition are not
important—all that matters is that it obeys the insertion-sort algorithm.26
Definition 9. The insertion-sort strategy is the strategy that after each
history offers a vote on {x, y}, where x is the -worst alternative unranked
26Our definition of strategies requires them to specify behaviour even after histories
that never arise. (For example, if X = {1, 2, 3}, a strategy that first offers {2, 3} must
specify behaviour after histories at which only {1, 2} are ranked, even though these are
never reached.) Any strategy whose on-path behaviour is described by the insertion-sort
algorithm will do for our purposes—we use this particular one for concreteness.
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with some even -worse alternative, and y is the highest-ranked alternative
-worse than and unranked with x. Equivalently in symbols, writing R for
the current proto-ranking and letting
L(z) := {w ∈ X : z  w and z 6R w 6R z} for each z ∈ X ,
x is the -worst x′ such that L(x′) is non-empty, and y is the R-highest
alternative in L(x) (i.e. y R z for every z ∈ L(x) \ {y}).27
4.2 Insertion sort is efficient
Theorem 1. The insertion-sort strategy is efficient, hence regret-free.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix a tournament W , and let R be the outcome of the
insertion-sort strategy under W . Fix alternatives x, y ∈ X with x  y and
x W y; we must show that x R y.
Enumerate all alternatives -worse than x as z1 R · · · R zK , where
zk = y for some k ≤ K. By definition of insertion sort, x will be pitted
against z1, z2, . . . in turn until it wins a vote. If it loses against z1, . . . , zk−1,
then it is pitted against zk = y and wins since x W y by hypothesis, so that
x R y. If instead x wins against z` for ` < k, then x R z` R · · · R zk = y,
whence x R y by transitivity of R. 
Corollary 2. There exists an efficient, hence regret-free, strategy.
To see intuitively why the insertion-sort strategy does so well, consider
again the case of three alternatives depicted in Figure 2 (p. 15). Suppose
first that the initial vote on {2, 3} went well (2 W 3). Offering {1, 2} next is
a good idea because it affords an opportunity of a favourable imposition of
transitivity: if the chair gets lucky (1 W 2), then she obtains 1 R 3 ‘for free’
from 1 R 2 and 2 R 3. (Even though it may be that 3 W 1.) Offering {1, 3}
would miss this opportunity.
Suppose instead that the initial vote on {2, 3} went badly (3 W 2).
Offering {1, 2} next would risk an unfavourable imposition of transitivity:
were the vote to go against her (2 W 1), then 3 would be ranked above 1
since 3 R 2 and 2 R 1. (Even though it may be that 1 W 3.)
To summarise, an intuition for why the insertion-sort strategy is regret-
free is that it never (1) misses an opportunity for a favourable imposition of
transitivity or (2) risks an unfavourable imposition of transitivity. We shall
27L(x) has an R-highest element (i.e. y is well-defined) because R is total on L(x). This
holds in turn because if z, w ∈ L(x) were unranked by R, where wlog z  w, then L(z)
would be non-empty, which would contradict the definition of x since x  z.
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see in §5.2 that this intuition is correct: Theorem 3 asserts that regret-free
strategies are precisely those that never miss an opportunity or take a risk,
in the above sense.
5 Two characterisations of regret-free strategies
Insertion sort is not the only regret-free strategy. In this section, we charac-
terise the class of regret-free strategies twice over. The first characterisation,
Theorem 2 (§5.1), is in terms of outcomes: the regret-free strategies are
exactly the efficient ones, i.e. those whose outcomes are W -efficient, for
each W . This characterisation is tight in the sense that for each W , every
W -feasible W -efficient ranking is the outcome under W of some regret-free
strategy (Proposition 1).
The second characterisation, Theorem 3 (§5.2), is in terms of behaviour:
regret-freeness requires precisely that two intuitive errors be avoided. These
errors, missing an opportunity and taking a risk, formalise the intuition for
the regret-freeness of insertion sort given in the previous section. We show
in addition that the advice offered by Theorem 3 can be operationalised
myopically: avoiding errors ensures that a non-error pair will always be
available to be offered next (Proposition 2).
5.1 The outcomes of regret-free strategies
We learned in §3.2 that efficient strategies are regret-free (Corollary 1, p. 14).
In fact, the converse is also true:
Theorem 2. A strategy is regret-free iff it is efficient.
The proof, in appendix D, establishes Theorem 2 jointly with Theorem 3
below (§5.2). The ‘if’ direction was already established in Corollary 1 (p. 14).
The following gives a feel for the ‘only if’ direction:
Example 2. Consider alternatives X = {1, 2, 3, 4} with 1  2  3  4 and
the following general will W :28
1
2
3
4
28Symbolically, 1 W 4 W 3 W 2 W 1, 3 W 1 and 2 W 4.
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There is exactly one W -feasible ranking that ranks 1 above 2, namely 1 R
4 R 3 R 2.29 Since no other W -feasible ranking ranks 1 above 2, R is W -
unimprovable. But R fails to be W -efficient, for it ranks 4 above 2 despite
the fact that 2 W 4. (Thus the converse of Lemma 1 (p. 13) is false.)
Let σ be a strategy that (i) first offers {2, 3}, (ii) then, in case 3 won,
offers {3, 4}, and (iii) next, in case 3 and then 4 won, offers {1, 4}. This
strategy has outcome R under W , so fails to be efficient. To see that it is
not regret-free, consider a general will W ′ that differs from W only in that
4 W ′ 1:
1
2
3
4
The outcome of σ under W ′ is 4 R′ 3 R′ 2 R′ 1.30 This ranking fails to be
W ′-unimprovable since 3 R′′ 2 R′′ 4 R′′ 1 is W ′-feasible and is more aligned
with  by inspection. Thus σ fails to be regret-free.
The broader insight underlying the ‘only if’ part of Theorem 2 is that
reaching a non-W -efficient outcome necessarily involves a sacrifice. (In the
example, σ forgoes the opportunity to rank 2 above 4.) For some general wills,
such asW , the sacrifice pays off. (It allows 1 to be ranked above 2, something
that no W -feasible W -efficient ranking achieves.) But for other general wills,
such asW ′, no reward materialises, yielding a non-W ′-unimprovable outcome.
The characterisation in Theorem 2 is tight, in the following sense:
Proposition 1. For any tournament W and W -feasible W -efficient ranking
R, some regret-free strategy has outcome R under W .
Thus no statement sharper than Theorem 2 can be made about the
outcomes under W of regret-free strategies: every W -feasible W -efficient
ranking is admissible. We give the proof of Proposition 1 in appendix E.
A non-trivial argument is required because a given W -feasible W -efficient
ranking can be reached in many ways, not all of which form part of a
regret-free strategy.31
29This can be verified directly. Alternatively, since there is exactly one W -path from 1
to 2 (namely (1, 4, 3, 2)), it follows by Observation 1 in appendix B.3 (p. 27).
30First 4 R′ 3 R′ 2 and 4 R′ 1 are determined. Then {1, 2} and {1, 3} are offered (in
some order that doesn’t matter), and 1 loses in both votes.
31To see why, return to Example 1 (pp. 10 and 13). The W -efficient ranking 1 R′ 3 R′ 2
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5.2 The behaviour of regret-free strategies
Recall the intuition provided in §4.2 for why insertion sort is regret-free: it
does not miss opportunities for favourable impositions of transitivity, nor does
it risk unfavourable impositions of transitivity. Our second characterisation
formalises this intuition.
Definition 10. Let R be a non-total proto-ranking, and let x  y be
unranked alternatives. (I.e. x, y ∈ X such that x 6R y 6R x.)
(1) Offering {x, y} for a vote misses an opportunity (at R) iff there is an
alternative z ∈ X such that x  z  y and y 6R z 6R x.
(2) Offering {x, y} for a vote takes a risk (at R) iff there is an alternative
z ∈ X such that either
(a) z  y, x R z and y 6R z, or
(b) x  z, z R y and z 6R x.
The ‘missed opportunity’ in (1) is that x R y (the hoped-for outcome
when offering {x, y} for a vote) could potentially have been obtained ‘for
free’ by offering votes on {x, z} and {z, y}, via a ‘favourable imposition of
transitivity’. The ‘risk’ in (2)(a) is that if the vote on {x, y} were to go badly
(so that y R x), then y R z would follow—an ‘unfavourable imposition of
transitivity’.
Definition 11. A strategy never misses an opportunity (never takes a risk)
iff it does not miss an opportunity (take a risk) on the path.
Theorem 3. A strategy is regret-free iff it never misses an opportunity or
takes a risk.
We give a joint proof of Theorems 2 and 3 in appendix D. The argument
is illustrated in Figure 3.
The ‘only if’ part of Theorem 3 asserts that opportunity-missing and
risk-taking are errors, in the sense that committing one of them will lead to a
non-W -unimprovable ranking under some W . This is intuitive, but requires
some work to show. To appreciate why, suppose that σ offers a pair x  y
under W , and that doing so either misses an opportunity or takes a risk. It
is then easy to find another tournament W ′ such that the outcome R of σ
may be reached by offering {1, 3} and then {2, 3}. But a strategy that does this cannot be
regret-free because it has outcome R′ also under the general will 1 W ′ 2 W ′ 3 W ′ 1, and
R′ is not a W ′-unimprovable ranking (since the more aligned ranking  is W ′-feasible).
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efficient
avoids
errors
regret-
free
appendix D.1
appendix D.2
Corollary 1 (p. 14)
Figure 3 – Proof of Theorems 2 and 3.
under W ′ ranks y above x, whereas some other W ′-feasible ranking R′ ranks
x R′ y. But that is not enough: to ensure that R′ is more aligned with 
than R, it must be that every pair {z, w} ranked ‘right’ by R (z  w and
z R w) is also ranked ‘right’ by R′ (z R′ w). We construct W ′ and R′ with
these properties in appendix D.2.
The ‘if’ part of Theorem 3 asserts that these are the only errors. Thus
to achieve regret-freeness, it suffices to avoid missing opportunities and
taking risks, separately after each history. The proof in appendix D.1 begins
with an arbitrary non-efficient strategy σ, meaning one whose outcome R
under some tournament W ranks some pair x, y ∈ X as y R x even though
x  y and x W y. The pair {x, y} cannot have been voted on (else x would
have prevailed), so y R x must have been determined by an imposition of
transitivity. We show that avoiding the two errors suffices to preclude such
‘unfavourable’ impositions of transitivity, so that σ must have committed the
one or the other.
Theorem 3 tells us that non-error pairs are attractive, but it does not
promise that they exist. In particular, there could conceivably be histories at
which the chair has committed no errors, but is now forced to do so because
no unranked pairs remain that can be offered without missing an opportunity
or taking a risk. The following proposition rules out this scenario:
Proposition 2. After any history at which the chair has not missed an
opportunity or taken a risk, there is an unranked pair of alternatives which
can be offered without missing an opportunity or taking a risk.
The proof is in appendix E.
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Remark 7. Proposition 2 shows that the characterisation in Theorem 3
of regret-free behaviour is tight: for any W and sequence of pairs that is
error-free under W , some regret-free strategy offers this sequence under W .32
Theorem 3, augmented by Proposition 2, allows us to give the following
simple ‘myopic’ advice to the chair. After each history, inspect the current
proto-ranking to identify an unranked pair of alternatives that would not
miss an opportunity or take a risk; that such a pair exists is guaranteed by
Proposition 2. Offer any such pair for a vote. By Theorem 3, the outcome
will be W -unimprovable whatever the general will W .
6 A characterisation of insertion sort
What, if anything, makes the insertion-sort strategy special? In this section,
we show that insertion sort is characterised (up to outcome-equivalence)
by a lexicographic property: among all strategies, it optimises the position
of the chair’s favourite alternative; among such strategies, it optimises the
position of the chair’s second-favourite alternative; and so on (Theorem 4,
§6.2). We further show that recursively applying the amendment procedure
is outcome-equivalent to insertion sort (Proposition 3, §6.3).
6.1 Outcome-equivalence
We call outcome-equivalent those strategies that have the same outcome
under every general will:
Definition 12. Two strategies are outcome-equivalent iff for every tourna-
ment W , they have the same outcome under W .
Say that two strategies σ, σ′ offer the same votes iff for any tournament
W , the pairs offered by σ under W are exactly those offered by σ′ (not
necessarily in the same order). Strategies that offer the same votes are clearly
outcome-equivalent, and the converse is in fact also true.33
32In particular, a strategy can be constructed which offers this sequence under W and
commits no errors under other general wills. Such a strategy is regret-free by Theorem 3.
33Suppose that σ (σ′) offers (does not offer) some pair {x, y} under some tournament
W . Let W ′ agree with W for every pair but {x, y}. Then σ′ has the same outcome under
W as under W ′, whereas σ does not—so σ and σ′ are not outcome-equivalent.
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6.2 Lexicographic characterisation of insertion sort
Let Rσ(W ) denote the outcome of a strategy σ under a tournament W .
Given an alternative x ∈ X , write
Nσx (W ) := |{y ∈ X : x  y and x Rσ(W ) y}|
for the number of -worse alternatives y that end up ranked below x when
σ is used under W . Let W be the set of all tournaments on X .
The chair wishes, for each alternative x ∈ X , to get each -worse altern-
ative y ranked below x. We call one strategy better for x than another iff
the former tends to rank more such ys below x:
Definition 13. Given an alternative x ∈ X and strategies σ, σ′, say that σ
is better for x than σ′ iff for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, we have
|{W ∈ W : Nσx (W ) ≥ k}| ≥ |{W ∈ W : Nσ
′
x (W ) ≥ k}|.
In other words, Nσx first-order stochastically dominates Nσ
′
x .
Definition 14. Given an alternative x ∈ X and a set Σ of strategies, a
strategy σ ∈ Σ is best for x among Σ iff it is better for x than any σ′ ∈ Σ.
For each alternative x ∈ X , the chair prefers that every -worse y be
ranked below x. Regret-free strategies differ in the priority they give to
different (x, y) pairs. The lexicographic priority focusses firstly on pairs in
which x is the chair’s favourite alternative, then on those in which x is her
second-favourite alternative, and so on:
Definition 15. Label the alternatives X ≡ {1, . . . , n} so that 1  · · ·  n.
A strategy is lexicographic iff among all strategies, it is best for 1; among
such strategies, it is best for 2; among such strategies, it is best for 3; and so
on.
Theorem 4. A strategy is outcome-equivalent to insertion sort iff it is
lexicographic.
The proof is in appendix F.
6.3 The (recursive-)amendment algorithm
In this section, we re-interpret the insertion-sort strategy in terms more
familiar in the agenda-setting literature.
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Amendment algorithm. Label the alternatives X ≡ {1, . . . , n} so that
1  · · ·  n. First, pit n − 1 against n. Then pit n − 2 against the winner.
Then pit n − 3 against the previous round’s winner. And so on. Call the
winner of the final round the final winner.
The amendment algorithm is designed to choose a single alternative. In
particular, the final winner is ranked top, since any other alternative either
lost a vote to it, or lost a vote to an alternative that lost to it, etc. Because
it approximates procedure in the legislatures of many English-speaking and
Scandinavian countries, the amendment procedure has received a great deal
of attention in the literature (see the references in §1.1).
The natural way to extend the amendment algorithm to obtain a ranking
(rather than a single choice) is the following recursion:
Recursive-amendment algorithm. Label the alternatives X ≡ {1, . . . , n}
so that 1  · · ·  n. First, run the amendment algorithm on X , and write y1
for the final winner. Next, run the amendment algorithm on X \{y1}, writing
y2 for the final winner.34 Then run the amendment algorithm on X \ {y1, y2}
to obtain a final winner y3. And so on. The resulting ranking is y1 R · · · R
yn−1 R yn, where yn denotes the unique element of X \ {y1, . . . , yn−1}.
Remark 8. Viewed as a sorting algorithm, recursive amendment is exactly
selection sort—see e.g. Knuth (1998, §5.2.3).
With three alternatives, recursive amendment coincides with insertion
sort (Figure 2 on p. 15 describes both). But with four or more alternatives,
they differ, as we show by example in supplemental appendix L.
Call any strategy that coincides with the recursive-amendment algorithm
on the path an amendment strategy. Amendment strategies offer the same
votes as insertion sort:
Proposition 3. Any amendment strategy is outcome-equivalent to the
insertion-sort strategy.
The proof is in appendix F.
7 Strategic voting
We have assumed history-invariant voting: a voter either votes for x at every
history at which {x, y} is offered, or else votes for y at every such history. In
34When the amendment algorithm demands a vote on a pair {x, y} that is already ranked
as (wlog) x R y, treat this as if the vote occurred and had outcome x W y.
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this section, we investigate the reasonableness of this assumption when voters
are strategic. We provide a rationale for a particular type of history-invariant
behaviour: sincere voting.
In particular, we show that sincere voting is (uniquely) dominant in the
following sense: any other strategy is not obviously better (is obviously worse)
against any (some) profile of strategies of the chair and other voters. Here,
‘obviously better’ means precisely that the outcome is more aligned with the
voter’s preference over alternatives.
7.1 Environment
Let each voter i ∈ {1, . . . , I} have a preference i over the alternatives X .
Like the chair, a voter is assumed to weakly prefer rankings that are more
aligned with her preference over alternatives.
A strategy σi of a voter specifies, after each history and for every offered
pair {x, y}, whether x or y should be voted for. Recall that a history records
only which pairs were offered and which alternative won in each pair, not
who voted how. The definition of a strategy therefore rules out complex
path-dependence. We shall return to this point (Remark 9 below).
A strategy is history-invariant iff for each pair x, y ∈ X , either the
strategy votes for x whenever {x, y} is offered, or else it always votes for
y. The leading example of such a strategy is the sincere strategy, which
instructs a voter to always vote for whichever alternative she likes better.
For a strategy σ of the chair and strategies σ1, . . . , σI of the voters, write
R(σ, σ1, . . . , σI) for the outcome (the ranking that results).
Definition 16. Let σi, σ′i be strategies of voter i, and σ, σ−i strategies of
the chair and the other voters. σ′i is obviously better than σi against σ, σ−i iff
R(σ, σ′i, σ−i) is distinct from, and more aligned with i than, R(σ, σi, σ−i).
When one strategy is obviously better than another, it yields a better
outcome no matter what voter i’s exact preference over rankings, given only
the weak assumption that voter i weakly prefers rankings more aligned with
her preference i over alternatives. By contrast, comparing strategies that
are not related by ‘obviously better than’ involves trade-offs.
7.2 Sincere voting is dominant
Definition 17. A strategy σi of a voter is dominant iff for any alternative
strategy σ′i,
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(@) there exist no strategies σ, σ−i of the chair and other voters against
which σ′i is obviously better than σi, and
(∃) there exist strategies σ, σ−i of the chair and other voters against which
σi is obviously better than σ′i.
Dominance is strong. (Albeit not as strong as conventional dominance,
since ‘obviously better’ is only a partial ordering.) Observe that there can
be at most one dominant strategy. In fact, there is exactly one:
Proposition 4. For each voter, the sincere strategy is (uniquely) dominant.
In words, deviating from sincere voting results in a no better (a worse)
outcome against any (some) strategies of the chair and the other voters, in
the sense of ‘more aligned with i than’. The proof is in appendix G.
Remark 9. Proposition 4 remains true, with the same proof, if the definition
of dominance is strengthened to allow the alternative strategy σ′i to be an
‘extended strategy’ that can condition on who voted how in previous periods.
Appendices
A Standard definitions
This appendix collects the definitions of order-theoretic concepts used in this
paper. Let A be a non-empty set, and Q a binary relation on it. Recall that
Q is formally a subset of A×A, and that ‘a Q b’ is shorthand for ‘(a, b) ∈ Q’.
For a, b ∈ A, we write a 6Q b iff it is not the case that a Q b. For a, b ∈ A
such that a Q b, we denote by [a, b]Q the Q-order interval
[a, b]Q := {a, b} ∪ {c ∈ A : a Q c Q b}.
Q is reflexive (irreflexive) iff a Q a (a 6Q a) for every a ∈ A, total iff
a Q b or b Q a for any distinct a, b ∈ A, complete iff it is reflexive and total,
asymmetric iff a Q b implies b 6Q a for a, b ∈ A, and transitive iff a Q b Q c
implies a Q c for a, b, c ∈ A.
The transitive closure of Q, denoted trQ, is the smallest (in the sense
of set inclusion) transitive relation that contains Q.35 The strict part of Q
is the binary relation strQ such that a strQ b iff a Q b and b 6Q a. For two
binary relations Q and Q′ on A, Q′ is an extension of Q iff both Q ⊆ Q′ and
strQ ⊆ strQ′.
35Every relation possesses a transitive closure because the maximal relation A×A is
transitive and the intersection of transitive relations is transitive.
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B Additional material for §2
This appendix complements the exposition of the environment in §2. We form-
ally define histories, strategies, outcomes and paths (§B.1), show that all and
only tournaments can be general wills (§B.2), and provide characterisations
of W -feasibility (§B.3) and of ‘more aligned with than’ (§B.4).
B.1 Formal definitions (§2.1–§2.2)
In this appendix, we formally define histories, strategies, outcomes and paths.
A history is a sequence ((xt, yt))Tt=1, where {xt, yt} is the pair offered in
period t, and xt is the winner (i.e. xt W yt):
Definition 18. There is exactly one history of length 0 (the ‘empty history’).
A history of length T ∈ N is a sequence ((xt, yt))Tt=1 of ordered pairs of
alternatives satisfying xt 6= yt and xt 6Rt−1 yt 6Rt−1 xt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
where R0 := ∅ and Rt := tr (Rt−1 ∪ {(xt, yt)}) for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. (Here
‘tr’ denotes the transitive closure.) The history is terminal iff RT is total.
Let HT be the set of all non-terminal histories of length T ≥ 0, and write
H := ⋃∞T=0HT for all non-terminal histories.36 A strategy offers, after each
non-terminal history, a pair of alternatives that are unranked at that history:
Definition 19. A strategy of the chair is a map σ : H → 2X such that for
each non-terminal history h ∈ H, we have σ(h) = {x, y} for some alternatives
x, y ∈ X such that (h, (x, y)) and (h, (y, x)) are histories.
A strategy σ and a tournamentW generate a terminal history ((xt, yt))Tt=1
as follows: for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, (xt, yt) is given by
{xt, yt} := σ
(
((xs, ys))t−1s=1
)
and xt W yt.
This history is associated with a sequence of proto-rankings (Rt)Tt=0, as
outlined in Definition 18 above.37
Definition 20. The outcome of a strategy σ under a tournament W is the
ranking RT associated with the terminal history they generate.
A strategy and a tournament also generate a sequence of non-terminal
histories—namely, all truncations of their generated terminal history. If a
non-terminal history is generated by σ and some tournament, we say that it
belongs to the path of σ.
36Histories can only be so long: HT is empty for (and only for) T ≥ |X | × (|X | − 1)/2.
37Namely, R0 = ∅ and Rt = tr (Rt−1 ∪ {(xt, yt)}) = tr
(⋃t
s=1{(xs, ys)}
)
for t ≥ 1.
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B.2 Which binary relations are general wills? (§2.2)
In this appendix, we prove that all and only tournaments are legitimate
general wills. A voting behaviour Vi specifies for each pair x, y ∈ X whether
voter i will vote for x (x Vi y) or for y (y Vi x). Formally:
Definition 21. A voting behaviour is a tournament. A voting profile is a
collection (Vi)Ii=1 of voting behaviours.
The general will of a voting profile (Vi)Ii=1 is the tournament W such
that x W y iff x Vi y for a majority of voters i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. The following
shows that all (and only) tournaments are the general will of some voting
profile (Vi)Ii=1, even if we insist that each voter’s behaviour Vi be transitive
(meaning that it can be rationalised as sincere):
Fact 1. For a binary relation W on X , the following are equivalent:
(1) W is a tournament.
(2) For every I ∈ N odd, W is the general will of some profile (Vi)Ii=1 of
voting behaviours.
(3) For some I ∈ N odd, W is the general will of some profile (Vi)Ii=1 of
transitive voting behaviours.
Proof. It is immediate that (2) and (3) (separately) imply (1). To see that
(1) implies (2), simply observe that a tournament W is the general will of
the voting profile (Vi)Ii=1 = (W )Ii=1 for any I ∈ N. The fact that (1) implies
(3) follows from McGarvey’s (1953) theorem. 
B.3 A characterisation of W -feasibility (§2.3)
This appendix contains a characterisation of feasibility used in our proofs.
Definition 22. Let R be a ranking. Alternatives x, y ∈ X with x R y are
R-adjacent iff there is no z ∈ X such that x R z R y.
Observation 1. Let W be a tournament, and R a ranking. The following
are equivalent:
(1) R is W -feasible.
(2) For any R-adjacent x, y ∈ X with x R y, we have x W y.
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Condition (2) admits a graph-theoretic interpretation. Think of W as a
directed graph with vertices X and a directed edge from x to y iff x W y (as
in Example 1 on p. 10), and think of a ranking R as a sequence of alternatives:
the highest-ranked, the second-highest-ranked, and so on.38 Condition (2)
requires precisely that R be a directed path in W .
Proof. (2) implies (1): Let R satisfy (2). Then R is the outcome under W of
any strategy that offers a vote on each R-adjacent pair of alternatives.
(1) implies (2): Let R be W -feasible, and let x, y ∈ X be R-adjacent
with x R y. By W -feasibility, there is a strategy σ whose outcome under W
is R. Along its induced history, it is determined that x R y. Since x, y are
R-adjacent, this cannot be via an imposition of transitivity. So it must occur
in a vote on {x, y}, in which x wins—thus x W y. 
B.4 A characterisation of ‘more aligned with than’ (§2.4)
In this appendix, we provide a characterisation of ‘more aligned with than’,
and use it to prove the claims made in §2.4 (p. 10) about the applications.
Observation 2. For rankings , R and R′, the following are equivalent:39
(1) R is more aligned with  than R′.
(2) For every non-empty set X ⊆ X , the R-highest alternative in X is
identical to or -better than the R′-highest alternative in X.
Proof. (1) implies (2): We prove the contra-positive. Suppose that R,R′ do
not satisfy (2), so that there is a non-empty X ⊆ X whose R-highest element
x is (strictly) -worse than its R′-highest element x′. Then R′ ranks x, x′
‘right’ (x′  x and x′ R′ x) whereas R ranks them ‘wrong’ (x R x′), so R is
not more aligned with  than R′.
(2) implies (1): We prove the contra-positive. Suppose that R is not
more aligned with  than R′, so that there are alternatives x, x′ ∈ X with
x′  x, x′ R′ x and x R x′. Then the R-highest alternative in X := {x, x′} is
(strictly) -worse than the R′-highest. 
Hiring (continued). We claimed that a more aligned ranking is precisely
one that hires a weakly -better candidate at every realisation of uncertainty.
This follows immediately from Observation 2.
38Formally: identify R with the sequence (xk)|X|k=1 such that x1 R x2 R · · · R x|X|.
39This is an instance of the Milgrom–Shannon (1994) comparative statics theorem:
viewing (X ,) as an ordered set of actions and R,R′ as (strict) preferences, (1) says that
R single-crossing dominates R′, and (2) says that R chooses higher actions than R′ does.
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Party lists (continued). Enrich the model so that only a random subset
X ⊆ X of candidates is available.40 We claim that R is more aligned with
 than R′ iff for every realisation (K,X) and every k ≤ K, the kth -best
candidate hired by R is weakly -better than the kth -best hired by R′.
To prove the ‘only if’ part, let R be more aligned with  than R′, and fix
an X ⊆ X and a K. Assume without loss of generality that K ≤ |X|. Label
the candidates {x1, . . . , xK} hired by R under X so that x1 R · · · R xK , and
similarly write x′1 R′ · · · R′ x′K for those hired by R′. We must show that
xk  x′k for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. We proceed by strong induction on k. The
base case k = 1 is immediate from Observation 2.
For the induction step, suppose for some k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} that x`  x′`
for every ` < k. Define Y := X \ {x1, . . . , xk−1, x′1, . . . , x′k−1}. We have
x`  x′`  x′k for every ` < k by the induction hypothesis. It follows that
x′k ∈ Y , and hence that x′k is the R′-highest alternative in Y . If xk ∈ Y , then
xk is the R-highest alternative in Y , whence xk  x′k by Observation 2. If
instead xk /∈ Y , then xk = x′`  x′k for some ` < k.
For the ‘if’ part, we prove the contra-positive. Suppose that R is not more
aligned with  than R′. Then by Observation 2, there is a subset X ′ ⊆ X
such that R hires a strictly -worse candidate than R′ at the realisation
(K,X) = (1, X ′) of uncertainty.
C An extension lemma
This appendix presents an extension lemma that is used in the proofs of
Theorems 2 and 3 in appendix D and of Proposition 4 in appendix G. Recall
from appendix A the definitions of ‘extension’ and of order intervals [x, y]R.
Extension lemma. Let R be a proto-ranking, and let A ⊆ X be such that
[x, y]R ⊆ A for all x, y ∈ A with x R y. Then the binary relation R ∪ A2
admits a complete and transitive extension.
The extension lemma is used directly in the proof of Theorems 2 and 3
(in particular, in the proof of Lemma 4 in appendix D.2). Before proving it,
we deduce the corollary used in the proof in appendix G of Proposition 4.
Extension corollary. Let R be a proto-ranking, and let x, y ∈ X be distinct
alternatives such that x 6R y 6R x. Then there is a ranking R′ ⊇ R such that
x, y are R′-adjacent with x R′ y.
That is, any proto-ranking that does not rank x, y ∈ X can be extended
to a ranking that ranks x above y, with nothing in-between.
40The grand set X = X can occur with high probability, if desired.
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Proof. Let R and x, y ∈ X satisfy the hypothesis. Then R ∪ {x, y}2 admits
a complete and transitive extension Q by the extension lemma. Note that
x Q y Q x. It follows that by appropriately breaking indifferences in Q, we
may obtain a ranking R′ ⊇ R ∪ {(x, y)} such that x, y are R′-adjacent with
x R′ y. 
To prove the extension lemma, we use a theorem due to Suzumura (1976).
Definition 23. A binary relation Q on a set A is Suzumura-consistent iff
for a1, . . . , aK ∈ A, a1 Q a2 Q · · · Q aK−1 Q aK implies that either a1 Q aK
or a1 6Q aK 6Q a1.
Suzumura’s extension theorem. A binary relation admits a complete
and transitive extension iff it is Suzumura-consistent.
See Bossert and Suzumura (2010, p. 45) for a proof.
Proof of the extension lemma. Let R and A satisfy the hypothesis; we seek
a complete and transitive extension of the relation Q := R ∪ A2. By Suzu-
mura’s extension theorem, it suffices to show that for any finite sequence of
alternatives (wk)Kk=1 such that w1 Q · · · Q wK , we have either w1 Q wK or
w1 6Q wK 6Q w1. There are two cases.
Case 1: wk R wk+1 for every k < K. Then w1 R wK since R is transitive
(being a proto-ranking), so w1 Q wK .
Case 2: {wk, wk+1} ⊆ A for some k < K. Let k′ (k′′) be the smallest
(largest) such k < K, so that w1 R · · · R wk′ if k′ > 1 and wk′′+1 R · · · R wK
if k′′ < K − 1. Assume toward a contradiction that wK Q w1 and w1 6Q
wK . Since {w1, wK} * A (as otherwise w1 Q wK Q w1), it must be that
wK R w1. It follows by transitivity of R that wk′′+1 R wK R w1 R wk′ ,
and thus {wK , w1} ⊆ [wk′′+1, wk′ ]R. Note that [wk′′+1, wk′ ]R ⊆ A since
wk′′+1, wk′ ∈ A by construction. Therefore {wK , w1} ⊆ A, which implies that
wK Q w1 Q wK—a contradiction. 
D Proof of Theorems 2 and 3 (§5, pp. 17 and 19)
We prove Theorems 2 and 3 jointly, in the manner depicted in Figure 3 (p.
20). We already showed that efficiency implies regret-freeness (Corollary 1,
p. 14). We shall establish the other two parts in §D.1 and §D.2.
D.1 Proof that error-avoiding strategies are efficient
The proof relies on two intermediate results, Lemma 2 and Corollary 3 below.
We first require an abstract fact about the transitive closure operation:
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Observation 3. Consider a proto-ranking R and unranked alternatives
x, y ∈ X (i.e. x 6R y 6R x). Let R′ be the transitive closure of R ∪ {(z, w)},
and suppose that y R′ x. Then (a) either y R z or y = z, and (b) either
w R x or w = x.
Proof. Since R′ is the transitive closure of R ∪ {(z, w)} and y R′ x, there
must be a sequence (zk)Kk=1 of alternatives with z1 = y, zK = x and
(zk, zk+1) ∈ R ∪ {(z, w)} for every k < K.
Since y 6R x and R is transitive, we must have (zk, zk+1) = (z, w) for some
k < K. The result follows since R is transitive. 
Definition 24. Let R be a proto-ranking. An ordered pair of alternatives
(x, y) ∈ X is a missed opportunity in R iff there is an alternative z ∈ X such
that x  z  y, y R x and y 6R z 6R x.
Lemma 2. Consider a proto-rankingR that contains no missed opportunities.
Let x  y be alternatives with y 6R x. Suppose that offering {z, w} does
not miss an opportunity or take a risk at R, and that doing this leads to a
proto-ranking R′ such that y R′ x. Then {z, w} = {x, y}.
That is: if no errors are made, then a misfortune y R′ x can occur only
as the result of a vote on {x, y}, not via an imposition of transitivity. This
captures the idea that avoiding errors is enough to preclude unfavourable
impositions of transitivity.
Proof. Let R, x, y, z, w and R′ satisfy the hypothesis of the lemma, and
assume wlog that z  w. We must show that z = x and w = y.
Claim. w R′ z.
Proof of the claim. Suppose toward a contradiction that w 6R′ z. We will
show that R contains a missed opportunity.
Since R′ is induced from R by offering {z, w}, and w 6R′ z, it must be
that R′ is the transitive closure of R ∪ {(z, w)}. Since y 6R x and y R′ x, it
follows by Observation 3 that (a) either y R z or y = z, and (b) either w R x
or w = x. Now consider two cases.
Case 1: z  x or z = x. We will show that z  x  y, y R z, and
y 6R x 6R z, so that (z, y) is a missed opportunity in R. Both x  y and y 6R x
hold by hypothesis. For x 6R z, suppose to the contrary that x R z; then
since w R x or w = x by property (b), we have w R z by transitivity of R, a
contradiction.
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To obtain y R z, observe that z  y since by hypothesis z  x or z = x,
and we know that x  y and that  is transitive. Thus z 6= y, whence
y R z follows by property (a). To see that z  x, simply note that z = x is
impossible because y R z and y 6R x.
Case 2: x  z. We will show that x  z  w, w R x, and w 6R z 6R x, so
that (x,w) is a missed opportunity in R. Both x  z  w and w 6R z hold by
hypothesis. For z 6R x, suppose to the contrary that z R x; then since y R z
or y = z by property (a), we have y R x by transitivity of R, a contradiction.
To obtain w R x, observe that x  w since by hypothesis x  z, and
we know that z  w and that  is transitive. Thus w 6= x, whence w R z
follows by property (b). 
In light of the claim, R′ must be the transitive closure of R ∪ {(w, z)}.
Since y 6R x and y R′ x, applying Observation 3 yields that (a) either y R w
or y = w, and (b) either z R x or z = x.
We claim that
z 6= x  w (1)
is impossible. Suppose toward a contradiction that (1) holds; we will show
that offering {z, w} takes a risk at R, i.e. that x  w, z R x and w 6R x. We
have x  w by (1), and z R x by (1) and property (a). To see that w 6R x,
suppose to the contrary that w R x; then since y R w or y = w by property
(a), it follows by transitivity of R that y R x, a contradiction.
Now suppose toward a contradiction that {z, w} 6= {x, y}. We claim that
z  y 6= w. (2)
If z = x, then z  y is immediate, and w 6= y follows since {z, w} 6= {x, y}
by hypothesis. Suppose instead that z 6= x. Since (1) cannot hold, it must
be that either w  x or w = x. Since x  y, it follows by transitivity of 
that w  y, so that w 6= y. Furthermore, since z  w, transitivity of  yields
z  y. So (2) holds.
It remains to derive a contradiction from {z, w} 6= {x, y}, using the fact
that (2) must hold. We shall show that z  y, y R w and y 6R z, so that
offering {z, w} takes a risk at R. We obtain z  y from (2), and y R w from
(2) and property (a). And it must be that y 6R z because y R z together with
property (b) and transitivity of R imply the contradiction y R x. 
Corollary 3. Suppose that R contains no missed opportunities, and that
offering {z, w} (where z 6R w 6R z) does not miss an opportunity or take a
risk at R. Then the proto-ranking R′ induced by offering {z, w} contains no
missed opportunities.
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Proof. Let R, z, w and R′ be as in the hypothesis of the lemma, and suppose
toward a contradiction that there is a missed opportunity (x, y) in R′.
We claim that y 6R x and y R′ x, so that Lemma 2 is applicable. It must
be that y 6R x, for otherwise (x, y) would be a missed opportunity in R. That
y R′ x is immediate from the fact that (x, y) is a missed opportunity in R′.
It follows by Lemma 2 that {z, w} = {x, y}. But since (x, y) is a missed
opportunity in R′, there is an alternative z′ ∈ X such that x  z′  y and
y 6R′ z′ 6R′ x, and thus y 6R z′ 6R x since R ⊆ R′. Thus offering {z, w} = {x, y}
misses an opportunity at R—a contradiction. 
Armed with Lemma 2 and Corollary 3, we are ready to prove that
error-avoiding strategies are efficient.
Proposition. A strategy that never misses an opportunity or takes a risk
is efficient.
Proof. Take a strategy σ that is not efficient, and suppose that it never
misses an opportunity or takes a risk; we shall derive a contradiction. Since
σ is not efficient, there exists a tournament W such that the outcome R of
σ under W fails to be W -efficient, which is to say that x  y, x W y and
y R x for some alternatives x, y ∈ X .
Write ∅ = R0 ⊆ R1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ RT ′ = R for the sequence of proto-rankings
associated with the terminal history generated by σ and W . Let T ≤ T ′ be
the first period in which x, y are ranked (y 6RT−1 x 6RT−1 y and y RT x).
Since x W y and y RT x, it cannot be that {x, y} is voted on in period T .
Because R0 = ∅ contains no missed opportunities and σ never misses
an opportunity or takes a risk, Corollary 3 promises that RT−1 contains no
missed opportunities. Thus by Lemma 2, σ must offer {x, y} in period T—a
contradiction. 
D.2 Proof that regret-free strategies avoid errors
The proof relies on two lemmata. For the first, recall from appendix A the
notation [x, y]R for R-order intervals.
Lemma 3. Given a pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X , let R′ be a ranking such
that x R′ y, and let W be a tournament that agrees with R′ on every pair
{z, w} * [x, y]R′ . Then the outcome under W of any strategy agrees with R′
on every pair {z, w} * [x, y]R′ .
Proof. Let x, y, R′ and W satisfy the hypothesis, and let R be the outcome
under W of some strategy of the chair.
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Claim. Let {z, w} * [x, y]R′ be such that (a) z R′ w and (b) x R′ z or
w R′ y. Then z R w.
Proof of the claim. Assume that x R′ z; we omit the similar argument for
the case w R′ y. Suppose toward a contradiction that w R z. Label the
alternatives [w, z]R ≡ {x1, . . . , xK} so that
w = x1 R · · · R xK = z.
Since R is W -feasible, we have x1 W · · · W xK by Observation 1 (ap-
pendix B.3, p. 27).
It must be that x R′ w, since otherwise z R′ w and the transitivity
of R′ would produce the contradiction z R′ x. We thus have x R′ w and
w /∈ [x, y]R′ , which means that y R′ w.
Suppose that y R′ xk for every k < K. Then {xk, xk+1} * [x, y]R′ for
every k < K. Since R′ agrees with W on pairs {z′, w′} * [x, y]R′ , it follows
that xk R′ xk+1 for every k < K, whence w R′ z by transitivity of R′—a
contradiction.
Suppose instead that xk′ R′ y for some k′ < K, and let k be the smallest
such k′. Since y R′ w = x1, it must be that k > 1. By definition of k, we
have xk R′ y R′ xk−1. On the one hand, the transitivity of R′ demands
that xk R′ xk−1. On the other hand, since {xk−1, xk} * [x, y]R′ (because
xk−1 6R′ y by definition of k) and xk−1 W xk, we must have xk−1 R′ xk—a
contradiction. 
Now fix a pair {z, w} * [x, y]R′ such that z R′ w; we must show that
z R w. If either x R′ z or w R′ y, then z R w follows from the claim.
Suppose instead that z R′ x and y R′ w. Observe that {z, x} * [x, y]R′ ,
(a) z R′ x and (b) x R′ y. We may therefore apply the claim to {z, x} to
obtain z R x. Similarly applying the claim to {x,w} yields x R w, whence
z R w follows by transitivity of R. 
Lemma 4. Let R be a proto-ranking, and let x, y, z ∈ X be such that
{x, y, z}2 ∩R ⊆ {(x, z)}.
Then there exists a ranking R′ ⊇ R ∪ {(x, z), (z, y)} such that [x, y]R′ =
[x, z]R ∪ {y}.
To interpret the conclusion, observe that the properties of R′ are equi-
valent to the following: (a) x R′ z and [x, z]R′ = [x, z]R, and (b) z R′ y and
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[z, y]R′ = {z, y}.41 In words, Lemma 4 runs as follows. Suppose that a proto-
ranking R ranks x above z, and has nothing else to say about {x, y, z}.42
Call the (possibly empty) set of alternatives ranked below x and above z
(i.e. [x, z]R \ {x, z}) the ‘in-between set’. The lemma asserts that R may
be extended to a ranking R′ that (i) adds nothing to the in-between set
([x, z]R′ = [x, z]R) and that (ii) ranks y immediately below z (z R′ y and
[z, y]R′ = {z, y}).
The proof of Lemma 4 relies on the extension lemma from appendix C.
Proof. Let a proto-ranking R and alternatives x, y, z ∈ X satisfy the hypo-
thesis. Define A := [x, z]R ∪ {y}.
Claim. For any x′, y′ ∈ A such that x′ R y′, we have [x′, y′]R ⊆ A.
Proof of the claim. Fix alternatives x′, y′ ∈ A with x′ R y′. By definition of
A, it suffices to show that {x′, y′} 63 y. So suppose toward a contradiction
that x′ = y; the other case is similar. We have y′ 6= y since x′ R y′ and R is
irreflexive (being a proto-ranking). Since y′ ∈ A, it follows that y′ ∈ [x, z]R.
By x′ R y′ and the transitivity of R, we obtain y = x′ R z. But y 6R z by
hypothesis—a contradiction. 
By the claim, the extension lemma in appendix C (p. 29) is applicable,
so there exists a complete and transitive extension Q of the binary relation
R ∪ A2. Since z′ Q w′ Q z′ for any z′, w′ ∈ A, we have in particular that
w Q y Q w for any w ∈ [x, z]R. We may therefore obtain the desired ranking
R′ by appropriately breaking indifferences in Q. 
With Lemmata 3 and 4 in hand, we are ready to prove that regret-free
strategies avoid errors.
Proposition. A regret-free strategy never misses an opportunity or takes a
risk.
41The formal proof of equivalence is as follows. If a ranking R′ has properties (a) and
(b), then x R′ z R′ y by (a) and (b), and
[x, y]R′ = [x, z]R′ ∪ [z, y]R′
= [x, z]R′ ∪ {y} since [z, y]R′ = {y} by (b)
= [x, z]R ∪ {y} since [x, z]R′ = [x, z]R by (a).
If a ranking R′ has the properties in the lemma, then x R′ z R′ y, so
[x, z]R′ ∪ [z, y]R′ = [x, y]R′ = [x, z]R ∪ {y}.
Hence [x, z]R′ = [x, z]R (whence (a)) and [z, y]R′ = {z, y} (whence (b)).
42For simplicity, neglect the case {x, y, z}2 ∩R = ∅.
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Proof. We shall prove the contra-positive. To that end, fix a strategy σ and
a tournament W such that σ misses an opportunity or takes a risk under W .
We shall construct a tournament W ′ such that the outcome R of σ under
W ′ fails to be W ′-unimprovable. In particular, we shall find a W ′-feasible
ranking R′ 6= R that is more aligned with  than R.
Let T be the first period in which σ either misses an opportunity or
takes a risk under W . Write RT−1 for the associated end-of-period-(T − 1)
proto-ranking, and let {x, y} be the pair offered in period T .
We shall consider three cases, based on the behaviour of σ under W in
period T . By hypothesis, {x, y} either misses an opportunity or takes a risk
at RT−1. If {x, y} misses an opportunity, there is an alternative z ∈ X such
that x  z  y and y 6RT−1 z 6RT−1 x. It cannot be that x RT−1 z RT−1 y, as
this would imply that x RT−1 y, contradicting the fact that {x, y} is offered
in period T . Thus one of the following must hold:
(a) x 6RT−1 z 6RT−1 y,
(b) x RT−1 z 6RT−1 y, or
(c) x 6RT−1 z RT−1 y.
If instead {x, y} takes a risk, then there is a z ∈ X such that either
(d) z  y, x RT−1 z, and y 6RT−1 z, or
(e) x  z, z RT−1 y, and z 6RT−1 x.
This yields three cases, as follows. Case 1 is (a). Case 2 encompasses both
(b) and (d) under the (slightly more general) hypothesis that ‘there exists
a z ∈ X such that z  y, z 6RT−1 y 6RT−1 z, and x RT−1 z’. Finally, case
3 encompasses (c) and (e) under the hypothesis that ‘there exists a z ∈ X
such that x  z, z 6RT−1 x 6RT−1 z and z RT−1 y. Since cases 2 and 3 are
analogous, we omit the proof for the latter.
Case 1: ∃z ∈ X such that x  z  y and {x, z, y}2 ∩ RT−1 = ∅. By
Lemma 4, there is a ranking R′ such that
R′ ⊇ RT−1 ∪ {(x, z), (z, y)} and [x, y]R′ = {x, y, z}.
Define W ′ to equal R′, except that y W ′ x. Clearly W ′ is a tournament, and
R′ is W ′-feasible by Observation 1 (appendix B.3, p. 27) since x, y are not
R′-adjacent. Denote by R the outcome of σ under W ′. It remains to show
that R 6= R′, and that R′ is more aligned with  than R.
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For the former, since x R′ y, it suffices to show that y R x. To this end,
observe that that RT−1 ⊆ W ′. Thus the history of length T − 1 generated
by σ and W ′ is the same as that generated by σ and W , which means in
particular that {x, y} is offered in period T . Since y W ′ x, it follows that
y R x, as desired.
To show that R′ is more aligned with  than R, observe that W ′ agrees
with R′ on every pair {w,w′} * {x, y, z} = [x, y]R′ . It follows by Lemma 3
that R and R′ agree on every pair {w,w′} * {x, y, z}. Since x  z  y and
x R′ z R′ y, it follows that R′ is more aligned with  than R.
Case 2: ∃z ∈ X such that z  y, z 6RT−1 y 6RT−1 z and x RT−1 z.
We shall begin with an auxiliary ranking R′′, then use it to construct our
tournament W ′ and ranking R′. By Lemma 4, there is a ranking
R′′ ⊇ RT−1 ∪ {(x, z), (z, y)}
such that
[x, y]R′′ = [x, z]RT−1 ∪ {y}. (3)
Define
X :=
{
w ∈ [x, z]RT−1 \ {x} : w  y
}
,
and let W ′ be such that
(i) w W ′ y for every w ∈ X,
(ii) y W ′ w for every w ∈ [x, z]RT−1 \X, and
(iii) W ′ agrees with R′′ on every other pair.
Denote by R the outcome of σ under the tournament W ′.
Observe that (i) y 6RT−1 w for every w ∈ X (since otherwise y RT−1
w RT−1 z, contradicting the case-2 hypothesis), (ii) w 6RT−1 y for every
w ∈ [x, z]RT−1 \ X (otherwise either x = w RT−1 y or x RT−1 w RT−1 y,
whence x RT−1 y), and (iii) RT−1 ⊆ R′′. Thus RT−1 ⊆ W ′ by definition of
the latter. It follows that the history of length T − 1 generated by σ and W ′
is the same as that generated by σ and W , which means in particular that
{x, y} is offered in period T . Since y W ′ x, we thus have y R x.
Since X ⊆ [x, y]RT−1 ⊆ [x, y]R′′ (by definition of X and (3)), W ′ agrees
with R′′ on every pair {w,w′} * [x, y]R′′ . It follows by Lemma 3 that R agrees
with R′′ on every pair {w,w′} * [x, y]R′′ . Therefore y, x are R-adjacent, so
that
[y, z]R = {y} ∪ [x, z]R = {y} ∪ [x, z]RT−1 = [x, y]R′′ . (4)
It follows that X ∪ {x} ⊆ [y, z]R.
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Define X ′ := X ∪ {x}, and label its elements X ′ ≡ {a1, . . . , aK} so
that a1 R · · · R aK . Similarly label [y, z]R \ X ′ ≡ {b1, . . . , bL} so that
b1 R · · · R bL.43 Let R′ be the ranking that
(I) agrees with R on any pair {w,w′} * [y, z]R, and
(II) ranks the elements of [y, z]R as a1 R′ · · · R′ aK R′ b1 R′ · · · R′ bL.
We have now constructed a tournament W ′ and a ranking R′. Recall that
R is the outcome of σ under W ′. It remains to show that
(dist) R′ is distinct from R,
(alig) R′ is more aligned with  than R, and
(feas) R′ is W ′-feasible.
For (dist), observe that since x ∈ X ′ and y ∈ [y, z]R \ X ′, we have
x = ak R′ b` = y for some k and `.44 Since y R x, it follows that R′ 6= R.
For (alig), fix a pair w,w′ ∈ X with w R w′ and w′ R′ w; we must show
that w′  w. By definition of R′, it must be that w′ ∈ X ′ = X ∪ {x} and
that w ∈ [y, z]R \X ′. Thus w′  y (by x  y and the definition of X) and
either y = w or y  w, whence w′  w by transitivity of .
It remains to establish (feas). To this end (recalling Observation 1 in
appendix B.3, p. 27), fix an R′-adjacent pair w,w′ ∈ X with w′ R′ w; we
must show that w′ W ′ w. There are two cases.
Sub-case (2)(a): {w,w′} * [y, z]R. Then w′ R w by part (I) of the
definition of R′. Since R agrees with R′′ on any pair {z′, z′′} * [y, z]R, it
follows that w′ R′′ w. It therefore suffices to show that W ′ agrees with R′′
on {w,w′}. Recalling the definition (i)–(iii) of W ′,
– If {w,w′} 63 y, then W ′ agrees with R′′ on {w,w′} by (iii).
– If w′ = y ∈ [y, z]R, then w /∈ [y, z]R = [x, z]RT−1 ⊇ X by (4), so neither
(i) nor (ii) applies to the pair {w, y} = {w,w′}. Thus by (iii),W ′ agrees
with R′′ on {w,w′}.
– If w = y ∈ [y, z]R, then w′ /∈ [y, z]R ⊇ [x, z]RT−1 ⊇ X by (4), so neither
(i) nor (ii) applies to the pair {y, w′} = {w,w′}. Thus by (iii), W ′
agrees with R′′ on {w,w′}.
43[y, z]R \X ′ is non-empty since y belongs to it.
44In fact, k = ` = 1 since y is R-highest in [y, z]R and (recall) y, x are R-adjacent.
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Sub-case (2)(b): {w,w′} ⊆ [y, z]R. Recall the definition (i)–(iii) of W ′.
Recall also part (II) of the definition of R′. Observe that y = b1 since y is
R-highest in [y, z]R, and y /∈ X ′ = X ∪ {x}. Furthermore, x = a1 since y, x
are R-adjacent (recall (4)) and x ∈ X. Finally, remark that K ≥ 2 since
z ∈ X ′ = X ∪ {x} and z 6= x.
Suppose first that w′ = y = b1. Then since w′, w are R′-adjacent with
w′ R′ w, we have w = b2 /∈ X ′ ⊇ X. Thus part (i) does not apply to the pair
{w, y} = {w,w′}. Thus part (ii) applies, yielding w′ = y W ′ w.
Suppose instead that w = y = b1. Then since w′, w are R′-adjacent with
w′ R′ w, we have w′ = aK ∈ X ′ = X ∪ {x}. Since x = a1 and K ≥ 2, we
have w′ 6= x. Thus w′ ∈ X, so that (i) applies to the pair {y, w′} = {w,w′},
yielding w′ W ′ y = w.
Finally, suppose that {w,w′} 63 y. Then W ′ and R′′ agree on the pair
{w,w′} by (iii), so it suffices to show that w′ R′′ w.
Since b1 = y /∈ {w,w′}, we have either {w,w′} ⊆ X ′ or {w,w′} ⊆
[y, z]R \X ′. Thus R and R′ agree on {w,w′} by part (I) of the definition of
R′, so that w′ R w.
Now label [w′, w]R ≡ {z1, . . . , zJ} so that z1 R · · · R zJ . Since R is
W ′-feasible, we have z1 W ′ · · · W ′ zJ by Observation 1 (appendix B.3, p.
27). By the hypotheses w′ ∈ [y, z]R and w′ 6= y, we must have y R w′ and
thus y /∈ [w′, w]R. This together with the fact that zj W ′ zj+1 for each j < J
implies, via part (iii) of the definition of W ′, that zj R′′ zj+1 for each j < J .
It follows by transitivity of R′′ that w′ = z1 R′′ zJ = w, as desired. 
E Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 (§5, pp. 18 and 20)
In this appendix, we establish tightness for the characterisations of regret-
freeness in Theorems 2 and 3. We begin in §E.1 with a lemma, then use it to
deduce Proposition 2 (§E.2) and Proposition 1 (§E.3).
E.1 A lemma
Definition 25. Given a proto-ranking R and alternatives x  y and z 6= w,
say that {z, w} makes {x, y} an error at R iff both x 6R y 6R x and z 6R w 6R z,
and one of the following holds:
– x  z  y, y 6R z 6R x, and w ∈ {x, y}.
– z  y, x R z and w = y.
– x  z, z R y and w = x.
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If {z, w} makes {x, y} an error, then offering {x, y} either misses an
opportunity or takes a risk at R, and the chair ‘should’ offer {z, w} instead.45
Recall from appendix D.1 (p. 31) the definition of a missed opportunity.
Lemma 5. Let R be a proto-ranking, and let A ⊆ X 2 be a non-empty set of
pairs of distinct alternatives. Suppose that for any pair {x, y} ∈ A, there is a
pair {z, w} ∈ A that makes {x, y} an error at R. Then R contains a missed
opportunity.
Proof. Let R and A satisfy the hypothesis. Then there is a pair {z, w} ∈ A
and another pair {z′, w′} ∈ A that makes {z, w} an error at R. Assume
(wlog) that z  w and z′  w′. Since {z, w} 6= {z′, w′}, we must have either
z 6= z′ or w 6= w′. Assume that z 6= z′; the case w 6= w′ is similar.
First claim. There exists a sequence (xt)Tt=1 in X with T ≥ 2 and x1 6= x2
such that for every t ≤ T , writing xT+1 := x1,
(i) if xt  xt+1 then xt+1 6R xt, and
(ii) if xt+1  xt then xt R xt+1.
Proof of the first claim. Define {x1, y1} := {z, w} and {x2, y2} := {z′, w′}.
By the hypothesis of the lemma, there is a pair {x3, y3} ∈ A with (wlog)
x3  y3 that makes {x2, y2} an error at R, a {x4, y4} ∈ A with x4  y4
that makes {x3, y3} an error at R, and so on. Since A is finite, {x1, y1}
makes {xT , yT } an error for some T ∈ N. We have T ≥ 2 and x1 6= x2 by
construction, and (i)–(ii) must hold because {xt+1, yt+1} makes {xt, yt} an
error at R. 
Let (xt)Tt=1 be a minimal sequence satisfying the conditions of the first
claim (one with no strict subsequence that satisfies the conditions).
Second claim. xt 6= xs for all distinct t, s ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Proof of the second claim. Suppose toward a contradiction that xt = xt+1;
then the sequence x1, . . . , xt−1, xt+1, . . . , xT satisfies the conditions of the
first claim, contradicting the minimality of (xt)Tt=1. Assume for the remainder
that xt 6= xt+1 for every t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Suppose toward a contradiction that xt = xs, where t + 1 < s. Then
the sequence xt+1, . . . , xs satisfies the conditions of the first claim, which is
absurd since (xt)Tt=1 is minimal. 
45This is heuristic, as offering {z, w} might itself miss an opportunity or take a risk at R.
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In light of the second claim, we may re-label the sequence (xt)Tt=1 so that
x1  xt for every t ∈ {2, . . . , T}. Let t′ ≤ T be the least t ≥ 2 such that
xT  · · ·  xt. (So t′ = T exactly if xt  xT for every t < T .) We shall show
that {x1, xt′} is a missed opportunity in R; in particular, that t′ ≥ 3 and
(a) x1  xt′−1  xt′ ,
(b) xt′ R x1, and
(c) xt′ 6R xt′−1 6R x1.
For (b), if t′ = T then xt′ = xT R x1 by property (ii), and if not then
xt′ R · · · R xT R x1 by property (ii), whence xt′ R x1 by transitivity of R.
The second half xt′−1  xt′ of (a) holds by definition of t′. The first half
xt′ 6R xt′−1 of (c) then follows by property (i). Since xt′ R x1, it follows that
t′ − 1 6= 1, which is to say that t′ ≥ 3. The first half x1  xt′−1 of (a) then
holds by construction. Finally, the second half xt′−1 6R x1 of (c) must hold
since otherwise the sequence (xt)t
′−1
t=1 would satisfy the conditions of the first
claim, in contradiction with the minimality of (xt)Tt=1. 
E.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (p. 20)
At a history at which the chair has committed no errors, the proto-ranking
clearly contains no missed opportunities. The following therefore implies
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2?. Let R be a non-total proto-ranking containing no missed
opportunities. Then there exist distinct x, y ∈ X such that x 6R y 6R x and
offering a vote on {x, y} neither misses an opportunity nor takes a risk at R.
Proof. Let R be a non-total proto-ranking, and suppose that for any distinct
x, y ∈ X with x 6R y 6R x, offering a vote on {x, y} either misses an opportunity
or takes a risk at R. We shall show that R contains a missed opportunity.
Let A be the set of all pairs {x, y} ⊆ X with x 6= y and x 6R y 6R x. The
set A is non-empty since R is not total. By hypothesis, for any {x, y} ∈ A,
offering {x, y} either misses an opportunity or takes a risk at R, implying
that some {z, w} ∈ A makes {x, y} an error at R. It follows by Lemma 5
(§E.1, p. 40) that R contains a missed opportunity. 
E.3 Proof of Proposition 1 (p. 18)
Lemma 6. Fix a tournament W , let R be a W -efficient ranking, and let
R′ ⊆ R be a non-total proto-ranking containing no missed opportunities.
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Then there exist distinct x, y ∈ X such that x 6R′ y 6R′ x, W and R agree on
{x, y}, and offering {x, y} does not miss an opportunity or take a risk at R′.
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix a tournament W and a W -efficient ranking R.
By Proposition 2 (p. 20; already proved), it suffices to find a terminal history
((xt, yt))Tt=1, with associated proto-rankings (Rt)Tt=0,46 such that
– for every t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, xt W yt and xt R yt, and
– for every t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, offering {xt, yt} does not miss an opportunity
or take a risk at Rt−1.
Such a terminal history is obtained by repeatedly applying Lemma 6. 
Proof of Lemma 6. We shall prove the contra-positive. Fix a tournament W
and a W -efficient ranking R, and let R′ ⊆ R be a non-total proto-ranking.
Suppose that for any distinct x, y ∈ X with x 6R′ y 6R′ x such that W and R
agree on {x, y}, offering {x, y} misses an opportunity or takes a risk at R′.
We will show that R′ contains a missed opportunity.
Let A be the set of all pairs {x, y} ∈ X 2 such that x  y, x 6R′ y 6R′ x,
and there is no z ∈ X such that x R z R y. The set A is non-empty since
it includes any R-adjacent pair {x, y} with x 6R′ y 6R′ x, and there must be
such a pair since R′ is non-total and R′ ⊆ R. By Lemma 5 (§E.1, p. 40), it
suffices to show that for any pair {x, y} ∈ A, there is a pair {z, w} ∈ A that
makes {x, y} an error at R′.
So fix a pair {x, y} ∈ A. We claim that W and R must agree on {x, y}.
If x, y are R-adjacent, then this holds by Observation 1 (appendix B.3, p.
27) since R is W -feasible. If x, y are not R-adjacent, then since no z ∈ X
satisfies x R z R y, it must be that y R x. Since x  y and R is W -efficient,
it follows that y W x, so that W and R agree on {x, y}.
It follows from the (contra-positive) hypothesis that offering {x, y} either
misses an opportunity or takes a risk at R′. Consider each in turn.
Case 1: {x, y} misses an opportunity. In this case there is a z ∈ X
satisfying x  z  y and y 6R′ z 6R′ x. Since {x, y} ∈ A, we must have either
z R x or y R z. Assume that z R x; the case y R z is analogous. Since
R′ ⊆ R, we have x 6R′ z 6R x. Thus the pair {x, z} lives in A and makes {x, y}
an error at R′.
Case 2: {x, y} takes a risk. Assume that there is a z ∈ X such that z  y,
x R′ z and y R′ z; the case in which x  z, z R′ y and z 6R′ x is similar. Then
{y, z} makes {x, y} an error at R′. To see that {y, z} belongs to A, observe
46Recall that R0 = ∅ and Rt = tr
(⋃t
s=1{(xs, ys)}
)
for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
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that (i) x R z since x R′ z and R′ ⊆ R, that (ii) y R z by (i) and {x, y} ∈ A,
and finally that (iii) z 6R′ y since otherwise x R′ z and the transitivity of R′
would imply the falsehood x R′ y. 
F Proofs of Theorem 4 and Proposition 3 (§6, pp. 22–23)
In this appendix, we prove our results concerning the outcome-equivalents
of insertion sort. We prove Theorem 4 and Proposition 3 in §F.1 using two
lemmata, then prove these lemmata in §F.2–§F.4. Throughout, we label the
alternatives X ≡ {1, . . . , n} so that 1  · · ·  n.
F.1 Proofs using lemmata
In this section, we state a definition and two lemmata, and use these to prove
Theorem 4 and Proposition 3.
Definition 26. Let Σ0 be the set of all strategies. For every integer k ∈
{1, . . . , n−2}, let Σk be the set of all strategies σ with the following property:
for any tournament W and alternative j ≤ k, labelling the alternatives
{j + 1, . . . , n} ≡ {xj+1, . . . , xn} as
xj+1 R
σ(W ) · · · Rσ(W ) xn,
the first vote involving j that σ offers under W is on {j, xj+1}; if j loses,
then a second vote involving j is offered, namely on {j, xj+2}; if j loses again,
then a third vote involving j is offered, namely on {j, xj+3}; and so on.
The definition of Σn−2 describes a natural generalisation of insertion sort:
for each alternative j, given how the -worse alternatives {xj+1, . . . , xn}
are ultimately ranked, the same votes involving j are offered, in the same
order, though not necessarily in adjacent periods.47 Each Σk for k < n− 2
is defined by the same property restricted to those alternatives j that are
-better than or equal to k, so that Σ0 ⊇ Σ1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Σn−2.
As the definition suggests, the strategies in Σn−2 are those that offer the
same votes as insertion sort:
Lemma 7. A strategy is outcome-equivalent to insertion sort iff it belongs
to Σn−2.
47Note a subtlety in the definition: although we label {xj+1, . . . , xn} according to the
outcome Rσ(W ) of σ under W , a strategy in Σk need not (as insertion sort would) have
totally ranked {j + 1, . . . , n} before offering votes involving j.
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Proof of Proposition 3. By inspection, any amendment strategy belongs to
Σn−2, so is outcome-equivalent to insertion sort by Lemma 7. 
The prove Theorem 4, a further lemma is required:
Lemma 8. Given k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}, a strategy σ ∈ Σk−1 is best for k
among Σk−1 iff it belongs to Σk.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let B0 = Σ0 be the set of all strategies, and for each
k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}, let Bk be the set of strategies in Bk−1 that are best for k
among Bk−1.48 A lexicographic strategy is precisely one that lives in Bn−2.
By Lemma 7, a strategy is outcome-equivalent to insertion sort iff it lives
in Σn−2; so what must be shown is that Σn−2 = Bn−2. We shall prove the
stronger claim that Σk = Bk for each k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2} by (weak) induction
on k. The base case k = 0 holds by definition of Σ0 and B0. For the induction
step, suppose that Σk−1 = Bk−1; then Σk = Bk by Lemma 8. 
The remainder of this appendix is devoted to proving Lemmata 7 and 8.
We begin in §F.2 with two preliminary results, then prove Lemma 8 in §F.3
and Lemma 7 in §F.4.
F.2 Preliminary results
The following lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. Given a k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}, consider a strategy σ ∈ Σk, a
tournament W , an alternative j ≤ k and some m ∈ {1, . . . , n− j}. Suppose
that under W , σ offers at least m votes involving j, and that j loses the first
m− 1 of these. Let ` be the mth alternative pitted against j, and let R be
the proto-ranking associated with the history after which the vote on {j, `}
occurs. Then ` R i for any i 6= ` such that i > j and j did not lose against i
prior to the vote on {j, `}.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that ` 6R i for some i 6= ` with i > j
such that j did not lose to i prior to the vote on {j, `}. Then there exists a
ranking W ′ such that R ⊆W ′ and i W ′ `. (Note that a ranking is precisely a
transitive tournament.) Being a ranking, W ′ is the only W ′-feasible ranking
(by Observation 1 in appendix B.3, p. 27), so that Rσ(W ′) = W ′, and in
particular i Rσ(W ′) `.
Let T be the period in which σ offers {j, `} (i.e. the mth vote involving
j) under W . Since R ⊆W ′, the history of length T − 1 generated by σ and
48Let Bk := ∅ if Bk−1 is empty. (It is in fact non-empty, but we haven’t proved it yet.)
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W ′ is the same as that generated by σ and W . So in particular, under W ′,
σ offers {j, `} in period T , σ does not offer {j, i} in an earlier period, and
j does not win a vote in any earlier period. Since σ ∈ Σk, it follows that
` Rσ(W ′) i, a contradiction. 
The proof of Lemma 8 relies on the following.
Lemma \. Given k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2}, if Nσk (W ) > 0 for some σ ∈ Σk−1 and
tournament W , then prior to winning its first vote, k is pitted only against
-worse alternatives.
Proof. We prove the contra-positive. Let k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2}, σ ∈ Σk−1 and
a tournament W be such that σ pits k against some j < k under W and k
wins no vote before the one against j; we must show that Nσk (W ) = 0. Let
R be the proto-ranking associated with the history after which the vote on
{j, k} occurs. It suffices to show that ` R k for all ` > k.
Claim. j wins no vote prior to the one against k.
Proof of the claim. Suppose toward a contradiction that the first alternative
against which j wins is ` 6= k. Then j R `. Since σ ∈ Σk−1, the vote on {j, `}
is the mth involving j, for some m < n− j. It follows by Lemma 9 (above)
that ` R k, which together with j R ` and the transitivity of R yields j R k.
On the other hand, since {j, k} is offered after a history with proto-ranking
R, we must have j 6R k 6R j. Contradiction! 
Fix an ` > k; we shall show that ` R k. Since σ ∈ Σk−1, the vote on {j, k}
is the mth involving j, for some m < n − j. It must be that σ offers {j, `}
prior to {j, k}, since otherwise Lemma 9 would yield k R `, contradicting
the hypothesis that k wins no votes prior to the one against j. Since j wins
no vote prior to the one against k and m < n− j, Lemma 9 yields ` R k, as
desired. 
F.3 Proof of Lemma 8 (§F.1, p. 44)
We shall use the probabilistic notation Pr(E|F ) := |E ∩ F |/|F | for the
fraction of tournaments in F ⊆ W that belong to E ∩ F ⊆ F , and similarly
Pr(E) := Pr(E|W). This corresponds the thought experiment in which the
general will W is drawn uniformly at random from W.
We must establish that membership of Σk is necessary and sufficient for
being best for k among Σk−1. We prove sufficiency and necessity in turn,
making use of Lemma \ from the previous section.
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Proof of sufficiency. Fix k, a strategy σ ∈ Σk−1 and an m ∈ {1, . . . , n− k}.
We shall derive an upper bound for Pr(Nσk ≥ m), then show that it is attained
if σ ∈ Σk.
For each ` ∈ {1, . . . , n− k}, let F` ⊆ W be the set of tournaments under
which σ offers at least ` votes involving alternative k, with alternative k
losing the first `− 1 of these and winning the `th.
Claim. Pr(F`) ≤ 1/2` for each ` ∈ {1, . . . , n− k}, with equality if σ ∈ Σk.
Proof of the claim. A tournament W lies in F` iff under σ and W ,
– alternative k loses its first vote (probability 1/2),
– a second vote involving alternative k occurs (probability ≤ 1, with
equality if σ ∈ Σk) and k loses (probability 1/2),
. . .
– an (`− 1)th vote involving alternative k occurs (probability ≤ 1, with
equality if σ ∈ Σk) and k again loses (probability 1/2), and
– an `th vote involving alternative k occurs (probability ≤ 1, with equality
if σ ∈ Σk) and k wins (probability 1/2).
Thus
Pr(F`) ≤ 12 ×
(
1× 12
)`−1
= 12` , with equality if σ ∈ Σk. 
By Lemma \ (§F.2, p. 45), if Nσk (W ) > 0, then prior to winning its first
vote, k was only pitted against -worse alternatives. There are n−k of these:
{k + 1, . . . , n}. Thus if Nσk (W ) ≥ m holds, then alternative k cannot have
lost strictly more than n−m− k votes and must have won at least one—so
in particular, W ∈ F1 ∪ · · · ∪ Fn−k−m+1. Thus
Pr(Nσ1 ≥ m) =
n−k−m+1∑
`=1
Pr(F`) Pr(Nσ1 ≥ m|F`)
≤
n−k−m+1∑
`=1
Pr(F`) (])
≤
n−k−m+1∑
`=1
1
2` , ([)
where ([) holds by the claim.
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Now suppose that σ ∈ Σk; we shall show that (]) and ([) hold with
equality, so that σ attains the bound. For ([), this follows from the claim.
For (]), fix an ` ∈ {1, . . . , n− k −m+ 1} and a W ∈ F`; we must show that
Nσk (W ) ≥ m. Label {k + 1, . . . , n} ≡ {xk+1, . . . , xn} so that
xk+1 R
σ(W ) . . . Rσ(W ) xn.
Since W ∈ F`, we have by definition of Σk that k Rσ(W ) x`+1. Thus
k Rσ(W ) x`′ for each `′ ∈ {`+ 1, . . . , n}, so that Nσk (W ) ≥ n− ` ≥ m. 
Proof of necessity. Take a strategy σ in Σk−1 \Σk. Since σ belongs to Σk−1,
it satisfies the inequalities (]) and ([) in the sufficiency argument. Suppose
that one or the other holds strictly for somem ∈ {1, . . . , n−k}, so that σ fails
to attain the bound in the sufficiency proof. Since any σ′ ∈ Σk attains the
bound for every m by the (just-proved) sufficiency part, it follows that σ is
not best for k among Σk−1. It therefore suffices to find an m ∈ {1, . . . , n−k}
such that either (]) or ([) holds strictly.
Since σ ∈ Σk−1 \ Σk, there is a tournament W such that, labelling the
alternatives {k + 1, . . . , n} ≡ {xk+1, . . . , xn} so that
xk+1 R
σ(W ) . . . Rσ(W ) xn,
one of the following holds under W :
(a) σ pits k against some j 6= xk+1 prior to pitting it against xk+1.
(b) For some ` ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n− k}, σ offers at least ` votes involving k,
the first `− 1 of which are against xk+1, . . . , x` and are all lost by k,
and the `th of which is against some j 6= x`+1.
(c) For some ` ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n− k}, σ offers exactly `− 1 votes involving
k, against xk+1, . . . , x`, each of which is lost by k.
Case (a). We shall exhibit a tournament W ′ ∈ F1 such that Nσk (W ′) <
n− k, so that (]) holds strictly for m = n− k. This is trivial if Nσk (W ) = 0
(let W ′ := W ), so suppose that Nσk (W ) > 0. Let j 6= xk+1 be the first
alternative pitted against k by σ under W , and let R be the proto-ranking
associated with the history after which this occurs. Clearly j 6R k 6R xk+1.
Since σ ∈ Σk−1 and Nσk (W ) > 0, Lemma \ (§F.2, p. 45) implies that j > k.
So xk+1 Rσ(W ) j (since j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} = {xk+1, . . . , n} and j 6= xk+1),
and thus j 6R xk+1.
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It follows that there is a ranking W ′ such that R ⊆ W ′ and xk+1 W ′
k W ′ j.49 (Note that a ranking is precisely a transitive tournament.) Let T
be the period in which σ offers {j, k} under W . Since R ⊆W ′, the history
of length T − 1 generated by σ and W ′ is the same as that generated by
σ and W , and thus {j, k} is the first pair involving k that σ offers under
W ′. Thus W ′ ∈ F1 since k W ′ j. Being a ranking, W ′ is the only W ′-feasible
ranking (by Observation 1 in appendix B.3, p. 27), so Rσ(W ′) = W ′. Thus
Nσk (W ′) < n− k since xk+1 W ′ k.
Case (b). If j > k, then case-(a) argument yields a W ′ ∈ F` such that
Nσk (W ′) < n − k − ` + 1, so that (]) holds strictly for m = n − k − ` + 1.
Suppose instead that j < k. Let W ′ be the tournament that agrees with W
on every pair, except that k W ′ j. Clearly W ′ ∈ F`. By (the contra-positive
of) Lemma \, we have Nσk (W ′) = 0. Thus Pr(Nσk ≥ 1|F`) < 1, so that (])
holds strictly for m = 1.
Case (c). Let E be the set of tournaments under which σ offers at least
`− 1 votes involving k, the first `− 1 of which k loses. Then Pr(E) > 0, and
the probability that σ offers at least ` votes conditional on E is strictly less
than 1. The argument for the claim in the sufficiency proof therefore yields
Pr(F`) < 1/2`, so that ([) holds strictly for e.g. m = 1. 
F.4 Proof of Lemma 7 (§F.1, p. 43)
We must show that membership of Σn−2 is necessary and sufficient for
outcome-equivalence to insertion sort. For the sufficiency part, we shall make
use of Lemma 9 in §F.3.
Proof of sufficiency. Let σ ∈ Σn−2, fix a tournament W , and let R (R′)
be the outcome of σ (of insertion sort) under W . We will show for each
k ∈ {n− 2, . . . , 1} that R agrees with R′ on {k, . . . , n}, using induction on
k. For the base case k = n− 2, let {j, `} be the first pair offered by σ, where
j < `; it suffices to show that j = n− 1. Suppose to the contrary; then by
Lemma 9 (§F.3, p. 44), prior to the first vote, ` is already ranked above every
i > j such that i 6= `, which is absurd. The induction step is immediate from
the fact that σ ∈ Σn−2. 
The proof of necessity refers to the argument for Lemma 8 in §F.3 above.
49To see why, observe that the transitive closure R′ of R ∪ {(xk+1, k)} is a proto-
ranking since k 6R xk+1. Since j 6= xk+1 and j 6R xk+1, we have j 6R′ k by Observation 3
(appendix D.1, p. 31), and thus the transitive closure R′′ of R′ ∪ {(k, j)} is also a proto-
ranking. Let W ′ be any ranking that contains R′′.
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Proof of necessity. Let σ /∈ Σn−2; we must show that it is not outcome-
equivalent to insertion sort. Note that there is a (unique) k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}
such that σ ∈ Σk−1 \Σk. Recall the bound in the proof of the sufficiency part
of Lemma 8 (§F.3 above). Since insertion sort belongs to Σk, it attains the
bound for everym ∈ {1, . . . , n−k} by the Lemma 8 sufficiency argument, and
thus all of its outcome-equivalents do. By the Lemma 8 necessity argument,
σ fails to attain the bound for some m ∈ {1, . . . , n− k}, so is not among the
outcome-equivalents of insertion sort. 
G Proof of Proposition 4 (§7, p. 25)
Fix a voter i, and let σ?i be her sincere strategy. We must establish properties
(@) and (∃) in the definition of dominance. For the latter, we shall make use
of the extension corollary in appendix C (p. 29).
Property (@): Fix strategies σ, σ−i of the chair and other voters and a
non-sincere strategy σ′i of voter i, and suppose that R′ := R(σ, σ′i, σ−i) is
distinct from R := R(σ, σ?i , σ−i); we must show that R′ is not more aligned
with i than R. Let T be the first period in which the proto-rankings RT
and R′T differ, and let {x, y} be the pair voted on in this period, where
(wlog) x RT y and y R′T x. The two strategy profiles generate the same
length-(T − 1) history h (by definition of T ), and thus the same period-T
votes σj(h) by the other voters j 6= i. So voter i is pivotal after history h,
and since σ?i is sincere it must be that x i y. Thus R′ ⊇ R′T is not more
aligned with i than R ⊇ RT .
Property (∃): Take any non-sincere strategy σ′i. Choose strategies σ′, σ′−i
such that σ′i votes non-sincerely along the terminal history induced by the
strategy profile (σ′, σ′i, σ′−i), and let T be the first period in which this occurs.
Then the proto-ranking in period T − 1 is the same under the strategy
profiles (σ′, σ′i, σ′−i) and (σ′, σ?i , σ′−i); call it RT−1. Write {x, y} for the pair
of alternatives that are voted on in period T , where (wlog) x i y.
By the extension corollary in appendix C (p. 29), there exists a ranking
R ⊇ RT−1 with x R y and x, y R-adjacent. Let R′ be exactly R, except with
the positions of x and y reversed. Clearly R is more aligned with i than
R′, and the two are distinct.
It thus suffices to find strategies σ and σ−i such that R(σ, σ?i , σ−i) = R
and R(σ, σ′i, σ−i) = R′. For the chair, let σ := σ′. As for σ−i, let half of the
other voters j ∈ I \ {i} vote according R (i.e. vote for x over y iff x R y),
and the rest vote according to R′. 
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Supplemental appendices
H A characterisation of our protocol
In this appendix, we show that among all possible rules of interaction between
the chair and committee that lead to a ranking, the ‘transitive’ protocol
studied in this paper (described in §2.1) is the only one (up to restriction)
that denies the chair arbitrary power and that allows votes only on pairs.
This protocol is thus the natural one, given the restriction to pairwise votes.
Non-binary votes raise issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.50
A ballot is a set of two or more alternatives. An election is (B, V ), where
B is a ballot and V is a map {1, . . . , I} → B specifying what alternative
each voter votes for. An electoral history is a finite sequence of elections
with distinct ballots. For two (distinct) electoral histories h, h′, we write
h v(@) h′ iff h is a truncation of h′.
A protocol specifies for each (permitted) electoral history either (1) a set
of ballots that the chair is permitted to offer or (2) a ranking. Formally:
Definition 27. A protocol is (H, ρ), where
(1) H is a non-empty set of electoral histories such that
– if h′ belongs to H, then so does any h v h′, and
– if h = ((B1, V1), . . . , (Bt, Vt)) belongs to H, then so does h′ =
((B1, V1), . . . , (Bt, V ′t )) for any V ′t : {1, . . . , n} → Bt.
Call h ∈ H terminal (in H) iff there is no h′ A h in H.
(2) ρ is a map that assigns a ranking to each terminal h ∈ H.
Call an electoral history binary iff each ballot has exactly two elements.
A binary protocol (H, ρ) is one whose H consists of binary electoral his-
tories. For any binary electoral history h = (({xs, ys}, Vs))ts=1, where wlog
|{i : Vs(i) = xs}| > I/2 for each s ∈ {1, . . . , t}, let Rh denote the transitive
closure of ⋃ts=1{(xs, ys)}.51 The transitive protocol is the binary protocol
that permits the chair to offer a ballot {x, y} after binary electoral history
50Unlike in the binary case, there is no ‘most natural’ non-binary protocol. In particular,
reasonable protocols can differ in what they deem the committee to have ‘decided’ in a
vote on three or more alternatives in which none won an outright majority.
51If h is the empty electoral history, then Rh = ∅.
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h exactly if the pair x, y is unranked by Rh, and assigns the ranking Rh to
each terminal h.52
To deny the chair arbitrary power, we focus on protocols that rank x
above y whenever x won an outright majority and y was also on the ballot:
Definition 28. A protocol (H, ρ) satisfies committee sovereignty iff for
any terminal h = ((Bt, Vt))Tt=1 ∈ H such that |{i : Vt(i) = x}| > I/2 and
y ∈ Bt \ {x} for some t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, we have x ρ(h) y.
For binary protocols, committee sovereignty is equivalent to imposing
transitivity after every vote:
Observation 4. A binary protocol (H, ρ) satisfies committee sovereignty iff
ρ(h) ⊇ Rh for every terminal h ∈ H.
That is, any pair linked by a chain of majorities (x Rh y) must be ranked
accordingly (x ρ(h) y), and so cannot be offered for a vote.53
Proof. Let (H, ρ) be binary and satisfy committee sovereignty, and take
a terminal h = (({xt, yt}, Vt))Tt=1 ∈ H, where wlog xt Rh yt for each t ∈
{1, . . . , T}. Then ρ(h) ⊇ ⋃Tt=1{(xt, yt)} by committee sovereignty, whence
ρ(h) ⊇ Rh because ρ(h) is transitive and Rh is by definition the smallest
transitive relation containing ⋃Tt=1{(xt, yt)}.
For the converse, let (H, ρ) be binary with ρ(h) ⊇ Rh for every terminal
h ∈ H. Take any terminal h = (({xt, yt}, Vt))Tt=1 ∈ H and suppose that
|{i : Vt(i) = xt}| > I/2; we must show that xt ρ(h) yt. Since xt Rh yt, this
follows immediately from ρ(h) ⊇ Rh. 
More is needed to deny the chair excessive power: she must also be
required to offer enough ballots to give the committee a fair say. To formalise
this, write x Sh y for an electoral history h = ((Bt, Vt))Tt=1 iff
x, y ∈ Bt and |{i : Vt(i) = x}| ≥ |{i : Vt(i) = y}|
for some t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, and say that h gives the committee a say on x, y iff
{z1, zL} = {x, y} for some sequence z1 Sh z2 Sh · · · Sh zL of alternatives.
52Explicitly it is (H?, ρ?), where H? consists of all binary electoral histories h′ such that
h @ (({x1, y1}, V1), . . . , ({xt, yt}, Vt)) v h′ implies xt 6Rh yt 6Rh xt,
(so that h ∈ H is terminal iff Rh is a ranking,) and ρ?(h) := Rh for each terminal h ∈ H?.
53Formally: if x Rh y, then no terminal h′ w h can feature the ballot {x, y} (except
in h). For otherwise there would be a terminal h′ in which y beats x in a vote, so that
x Rh
′
y Rh
′
x, which is impossible since ρ(h′) ⊇ Rh′ and ρ(h′) is a ranking.
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Definition 29. A protocol (H, ρ) satisfies democratic legitimacy iff every
terminal h ∈ H gives the committee a say on each pair of alternatives.
Write τ(H) for the terminal elements of H. A protocol (H, ρ) is a restric-
tion of (H′, ρ′) iff τ(H) ⊆ τ(H′) and ρ = ρ′|τ(H).54 To wit, anything the chair
can do under (H, ρ), she can also do under (H′, ρ′).
Proposition 5. A protocol is binary and satisfies committee sovereignty
and democratic legitimacy iff it is a restriction of the transitive protocol.
Thus any binary protocol that does not give the chair arbitrary power
must be the transitive protocol, possibly with limitations on what unranked
pairs the chair may offer at some histories. Neglecting such limitations as ad
hoc, we arrive at the transitive protocol.
Proof. Any restriction of the transitive protocol (H?, ρ?) satisfies the three
properties since (H?, ρ?) does and the properties are preserved under restric-
tion. For the converse, let (H, ρ) satisfy the three properties; we must show
that τ(H) ⊆ τ(H?) and ρ = ρ?|τ(H).
To establish τ(H) ⊆ τ(H?), we show separately that H ⊆ H? and that
any h ∈ τ(H) ⊆ H? is terminal in H?. For the former, fix a pair of electoral
histories h @ h′ = (({xs, ys}, Vs))ts=1 ∈ H. We must show that the pair xt, yt
is unranked by Rh, so suppose toward a contradiction that xt Rh yt. Then we
must have xt ρ(h′′) yt for any terminal h′′ ∈ H such that h′′ w h since ρ(h′′) ⊇
Rh
′′ ⊇ Rh by Observation 4. In particular, this must hold for any terminal
h′′ ∈ H with first t−1 elections ({x1, y1}, V1), . . . , ({xt−1, yt−1}, Vt−1) and tth
election ({xt, yt}, V ′t ), where V ′t satisfies |{i : V ′t (i) = yt}| > I/2. But for such
an h′′, committee sovereignty of (H, ρ) clearly demands that yt ρ(h′′) xt—a
contradiction.
For the latter, let h ∈ τ(H) ⊆ H?; we must show that h is terminal in H?,
meaning precisely that Rh is total. Since h is binary, a pair x, y is ranked by
Rh iff h gives the committee a say on x, y. And h gives the committee a say
on every pair since (H, ρ) satisfies democratic legitimacy.
To show that ρ = ρ?|τ(H), fix an h ∈ τ(H). Then ρ(h) ⊇ Rh = ρ?(h) by
Observation 4 and the definition of ρ?, and the containment must be an
equality since ρ(h) and ρ?(h) are both rankings. 
I How many W -feasible rankings are W -unimprovable?
This appendix contains two results. In §I.1, we show that for a given tourna-
ment W , every W -feasible ranking is W -unimprovable iff W is transitive. In
54τ(H) ⊆ τ(H′) holds exactly if H ⊆ H′ and any h ∈ τ(H) is terminal in H′.
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§I.2, we show that on average across tournaments W , only a small fraction
of W -feasible rankings are W -unimprovable if there are many alternatives.
I.1 When is agenda-setting valuable?
Given the general will W , the value of agenda-setting lies in being able to
reach a W -unimprovable ranking rather than some (necessarily W -feasible)
ranking that is not W -unimprovable. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 30. Given her preference  (a ranking), the chair benefits from
agenda-setting under a tournament W iff there exists a W -feasible ranking
that is not W -unimprovable.
Proposition 6. For a tournament W , the following are equivalent:
(1) W is not a ranking (i.e. is not transitive).
(2) For some , the chair benefits from agenda-setting under W .
(3) For every , the chair benefits from agenda-setting under W .
In words, agenda-setting is valuable precisely because it allows the chair
to exploit Condorcet cycles: the chair benefits whenever there is a cycle in
W , and otherwise does not benefit.
The proof relies on concepts and results from §3–§4.
Proof. (3) immediately implies (2). To see that (2) implies (1), consider
the contra-positive: if W is a ranking, then it is clearly the only W -feasible
ranking, so the chair does not benefit from agenda-setting for any .
To show that (1) implies (3), fix any ranking  and any tournament W
that is not a ranking; it suffices to exhibit distinct W -feasible rankings R
and R′ such that R is more aligned with  than R′. Call a ranking W -anti-
efficient iff it is W -efficient when the chair’s preference is reversed: for any
pair x, y ∈ X of alternatives with x ≺ y and x W y, we have x R y.
By Theorem 1 (p. 16), there exist W -feasible rankings R and R′ which
are, respectively, W -efficient and W -anti-efficient. We claim that R is more
aligned with  than R′. To show this, take x, y ∈ X with x  y. If x W y,
then x R y since R is W -efficient. If instead y W x, then y R′ x since R′ is
W -anti-efficient. In sum, either x R′ y fails or x R y holds, which is to say
that x R′ y implies x R y.
It remains only to show that R and R′ are distinct. Since W is not a
ranking, there must be x, y, z ∈ X such that x W y W z W x. Suppose
wlog that x  z. There are three cases. If x  y  z, then x R y R z and
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z R′ x R′ y, which are distinct. If y  x  z, then y R z R x and z R′ x R′ y,
which are distinct. If x  z  y, then x R y R z and y R′ z R′ x, which are
distinct. 
I.2 Most W -feasible rankings are not W -unimprovable
The following asserts that when there are enough alternatives, only a small
fraction of a typical W ’s W -feasible rankings are W -unimprovable.
Proposition 7. For each n ∈ N, let Rn (Wn) denote a uniform random
draw from the set of all rankings (tournaments) on Xn := {1, . . . , n}, with
Rn and Wn independent. Then
Pr (Rn is Wn-unimprovable|Rn is Wn-feasible)→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. Fix any n ≥ 5, and define Kn := b(n− 1)/4c. Further fix a ranking
R and a tournament W on Xn, and label the alternatives Xn = {x1, . . . , xn}
so that x1 R . . . R xn. Given k ∈ {1, . . . ,Kn}, say that R admits a local
W -improvement at (x4k−2, x4k−1, x4k) iff both
– x4k−3 W x4k W x4k−2 and x4k−1 W x4k+1, and
– x4k  x4k−1 and x4k  x4k−2.
If R admits a local W -improvement at (x4k−2, x4k−1, x4k), then it fails to be
W -unimprovable since the ranking
x1 R
′ · · · R′ x4k−3 R′ x4k R′ x4k−2 R′ x4k−1 R′ x4k+1 R′ · · · R′ xn
is then W -feasible (by Observation 1 in appendix B.3 (p. 27)) and more
aligned with .
For each n ≥ 5, let (Xnk )nk=1 be random variables such that
{Xn1 , . . . , Xnn} = Xn and Xn1 Rn . . . Rn Xnn a.s.
The events ‘Xn4k  Xn4k−1 and Xn4k  Xn4k−2’ are independent across k ∈
{1, . . . ,Kn} and each have probability 1/4. It follows by Observation 1 that
conditional on Rn being Wn-feasible, the events
‘Rn admits a local Wn-improvement at
(
Xn4k−2, X
n
4k−1, X
n
4k
)
’
are independent across k ∈ {1, . . . ,Kn} and have probability (1/2)5. Thus
Pr (Rn is Wn-unimprovable|Rn is Wn-feasible) ≤
(
1− (1/2)5
)Kn
,
which vanishes as n→∞ since Kn = b(n− 1)/4c diverges. 
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J Indecisive votes
In this appendix, we allow the vote on a pair of alternatives to be indecisive,
in which case the chair may choose how they are ranked. (This occurs e.g.
when the chair is a voting member of the committee.) To that end, we
re-interpret x W y to mean that the chair is permitted to rank x above y,
and allow for the possibility that both x W y and y W x. A vote on {x, y}
with x W y is indecisive if also y W x, and decisive otherwise.
The general will W must still be total and irreflexive, but not neces-
sarily asymmetric. By appeal to an argument similar to that for Fact 1
(appendix B.2, p. 27), any total and irreflexive relation W should be con-
sidered.
A history still records what pairs were offered and how each pair was
ranked, and a strategy now specifies not only what pair to offer after each
history, but also how to rank them if the vote is indecisive. Note that a history
does not record whether a vote was decisive or not, and thus that we rule
out strategies that condition on this information. We show in supplemental
appendix K how this restriction may be dropped.
Regret-free and efficient strategies are defined as before, with ‘for any
tournament W ’ replaced by ‘for any total and irreflexive W ’. By Lemma 1
(p. 13), efficiency still implies regret-freeness.
When the chair offers {x, y} with x  y and the vote is indecisive, we
say that she ranks in her interest iff she ranks x above y, and against her
interest otherwise. Augment the definition of the insertion sort in §4 so that
the chair ranks in her interest whenever a vote is indecisive. Theorem 1 (§4,
p. 16) remains true, with the same proof: insertion sort is efficient, and thus
regret-free.
The characterisations of regret-free strategies (Theorems 2 and 3 in §5,
pp. 17 and 19) extend as follows:
Theorem (2+3)′. For a strategy σ, the following are equivalent:
(a) σ is regret-free.
(b) σ is efficient.
(c) σ never misses an opportunity, takes a risk, or ranks against the chair’s
interest.
Proof. We establish the implications depicted in Figure 3 (p. 20). The proof
that (c) implies (b) given in appendix D.1 applies essentially unchanged.
That (b) implies (a) follows from Lemma 1 (p. 13).
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To show that (a) implies (c), observe that the proof in appendix D.2
establishes that regret-free strategies never miss an opportunity or take a
risk. It therefore remains only to show that a regret-free strategy must not
rank against the chair’s interest.
We prove the contra-positive. Let σ be a strategy that ranks against
the chair’s interest under some tournament W ; we shall find a tournament
W ′ such that the outcome R of σ under W ′ fails to be W ′-unimprovable.
In particular, we shall exhibit a W ′-feasible ranking R′ 6= R that is more
aligned with  than R.
Let T be the first period in which σ ranks against the chair’s interest
under W . Write RT−1 for the associated end-of-period-(T − 1) proto-ranking,
and let {x, y} be the pair offered in period T . By hypothesis, x W y W x,
and the chair chooses to rank y above x.
By the extension corollary in appendix C (p. 29), there exists a ranking
R′ ⊇ RT−1 ∪ {(x, y)} such that x, y are R′-adjacent. Define a tournament
W ′ by W ′ := R′ ∪ {(y, x)}, and denote by R the outcome of σ under W ′.
Clearly R′ is W ′-feasible. It remains to show that R 6= R′ and that R′ is
more aligned with  than R.
For the former, since x R′ y, it suffices to show that y R x. To this
end, observe that that RT−1 ⊆ R′ ⊆ W ′. Thus the history of length T − 1
generated by σ and W ′ is the same as that generated by σ and W , which
means in particular that {x, y} is offered in period T , and that y is ranked
above x if the vote is indecisive. Under W ′, the vote is indeed indecisive
(x W ′ y W ′ x), and thus y R x as desired.
To show that R′ is more aligned with  than R, observe that W ′ agrees
with R′ on every pair {z, w} * {x, y} = [x, y]R′ . It follows by Lemma 3 in
appendix D.2 (p. 33) that R and R′ agree on every pair {z, w} 6= {x, y}.
Since x  y and x R′ y, it follows that R′ is more aligned with  than R. 
All of the remaining results also extend: the characterisations of regret-
freeness are tight (Propositions 1 and 2 in §5, pp. 18 and 20), the outcome-
equivalents of insertion sort are (include) the lexicographic (amendment)
strategies (Theorem 4 and Proposition 3 in §6, pp. 22 and 23), and sincere
voting is dominant (Proposition 4 in §7, p. 25).
K Strategies with extended history-dependence
By definition, a strategy does not condition on who voted how in the past. To
relax this restriction, let an extended history be a sequence of pairs offered
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and votes cast by each member on each pair, and let an extended strategy
assign to each extended history an unranked pair of alternatives.
Recall from appendix B.2 (p. 27) the definition of voting profiles. The
outcome of an extended strategy σ under a voting profile (Vi)Ii=1 is the
final ranking that results. A strategy is regret-free (efficient) iff its outcome
under every voting profile (Vi)Ii=1 is W -unimprovable (W -efficient), where
W denotes the general will of (Vi)Ii=1.
Insertion sort is clearly an extended strategy, so is efficient by Theorem 1
(§4, p. 16). Our characterisation of regret-freeness (Theorems 2 and 3 in §5,
pp. 17 and 19) remains valid:
Theorem (2+3)′′. For an extended strategy σ, the following are equivalent:
(a) σ is regret-free.
(b) σ is efficient.
(c) σ never misses an opportunity or takes a risk.
Proof. We prove the implications depicted in Figure 3 (p. 20). That (c)
implies (b) follows from the argument in appendix D.1, which applies un-
changed to extended strategies. That (b) implies (a) follows from Lemma 1
(p. 13).
To show that (a) implies (c), we prove the contra-positive by augmenting
the argument in appendix D.2. Take an extended strategy σ that misses
an opportunity or takes a risk under some voting profile (Vi)Ii=1, and let
t be the first period in which this occurs. Let W be the general will of
(Vi)Ii=1. Construct an alternative general will W ′ exactly as in the proof in
appendix D.2. Construct in addition a voting profile (V ′i )Ii=1 whose general
will is W ′, and such that the extended history up to time t under σ and
(V ′i )Ii=1 is the same as under σ and (Vi)Ii=1. The argument in appendix D.2
ensures that the outcome of σ under (V ′i )Ii=1 fails to be W ′-unimprovable.
Thus σ fails to be regret-free. 
L Insertion sort and recursive amendment are distinct
Proposition 3 (p. 23) asserts that recursive amendment is outcome-equivalent
to insertion sort. The following example shows that the two are nonetheless
distinct: they offer the same votes, but not always in the same order.
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Example 3. Consider alternatives X = {1, 2, 3, 4}, where the chair’s prefer-
ence is 1  2  3  4 and the general will W is as follows:
1
4
3
2
Insertion sort first offers {3, 4} (4 R 3). It then inserts 2 into {3, 4} by
offering {2, 4} (4 R 2), then {2, 3} (4 R 2 R 3). It finally inserts 1 into
{2, 3, 4} by offering {1, 4}.
Recursive amendment also first offers {3, 4} (4 wins). It then pits the
winner 4 against 2 (4 wins again), and then 4 against 1, leaving 1 the final
winner. Next, the amendment algorithm is applied to {2, 3, 4}, with final
winner 4.55 Finally, the amendment algorithm is applied to {2, 3}, and the
(final) winner 2 is ranked third.
M Relation to ranking methods
In this appendix, we investigate the link with the social choice literature
mentioned in §1.1 (p. 4). We recast the chair’s problem as a choice among
ranking methods, characterise the constraint set of this problem, and compare
its solutions to ranking methods in the literature.
A ranking method is a map that assigns to each tournament a ranking.
Each strategy σ induces a ranking method, namely the one whose value at a
tournamentW is the outcome of σ underW . Call a ranking method ρ feasible
iff it is induced by some strategy, and regret-free iff ρ(W ) is W -unimprovable
for every W . Clearly the chair’s problem in §2 can be re-formulated as a
choice between ranking methods, where the constraint set consists of the
feasible ranking methods and the objective is to choose a regret-free one.
For a tournament W and rankings R,R′, say that R is more aligned with
W than R′ iff for any pair x, y ∈ X of alternatives with x W y, if x R′ y
then also x R y. This is exactly the definition in the text (§2.4, p. 10), except
that we allow W to be any tournament (not necessarily a ranking).
Definition 31. A ranking method ρ is faithful iff for every tournament W ,
no ranking R 6= ρ(W ) is more aligned with W than ρ(W ).
55Since 4 R 2 and 4 R 3 had already been determined, no votes are actually offered.
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Faithfulness clearly admits a normative interpretation. It is a natural
strengthening of Condorcet consistency, the requirement that ρ(W ) rank x
highest if x W y for every alternative y 6= x. The following shows that it also
has a positive interpretation:
Observation 5. A ranking method ρ is faithful iff ρ(W ) is W -feasible for
every tournament W .
Proof. Fix a ranking method ρ and a tournamentW , and write R := ρ(W ). If
R isW -feasible, then any R′ 6= R fails to be more aligned withW since it must
rank some R-adjacent pair x R y as y R′ x, where x W y by Observation 1
(appendix B.3, p. 27). If R is not W -feasible, then by Observation 1 there
is an R-adjacent pair x R y such that y W x, so the ranking R′ 6= R that
agrees with R on every pair but x, y is more aligned with W . 
By Observation 5, any feasible ranking method must be faithful. The
converse does not hold, because feasibility also imposes restrictions across
tournaments. To describe these constraints, we introduce a second property:
Definition 32. A ranking method ρ is consistent iff whenever ρ(W ) 6= ρ(W ′)
for two tournaments W and W ′, there are alternatives x, y ∈ X such that
x W y W ′ x and
x ρ(W ′′) y iff x W ′′ y for every tournament W ′′ ⊇W ∩W ′.
This property is mathematically natural, but we do not think that it has
any normative appeal. Instead, it captures constraints that the rules of the
interaction impose on the chair:
Proposition 8. A ranking method is feasible iff it is faithful and consistent.
Call a ranking method ρ efficient iff ρ(W ) is W -efficient for every tourna-
ment W . (W -efficiency is defined on p. 12.) By Theorem 2 (p. 17), a feasible
ranking method is regret-free iff it is efficient. Thus:
Corollary 4. A ranking method is feasible and regret-free iff it is faithful,
consistent and efficient.
While faithfulness has a normative interpretation, consistency and effi-
ciency are ‘positive’ in nature: the former is a constraint imposed by the rules
of the game, while the latter is defined in terms of the chair’s self-interested
preference . This makes feasible and regret-free ranking methods quite dif-
ferent from those studied in the literature, which are characterised by purely
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normative axioms (e.g. Rubinstein (1980) for the Copeland method). Indeed,
standard ranking methods such as those of Copeland and Kemeny–Slater
are neither consistent nor efficient, though the latter is faithful.
Proof of Proposition 8. For necessity, let ρ be feasible. Then ρ is faithful by
Observation 5. To show that it is consistent, let σ be a strategy inducing
ρ, and fix tournaments W and W ′ such that ρ(W ) 6= ρ(W ′). Let t be the
first period in which the history generated by σ and W differs from that
generated by σ and W ′, and let {x, y} be the pair offered in this period.
Then W and W ′ disagree on {x, y}. Furthermore, the pair {x, y} is clearly
offered in period t of the history generated by σ and any W ′′ ⊇W ∩W ′, so
that x ρ(W ′′) y iff x W ′′ y.
For sufficiency, let ρ be faithful and consistent; we shall construct a
strategy that induces ρ. For each history h, let W h and W ′h be tournaments
such that
(a) if h = ((xt, yt))Tt=1, then xt W h yt and xt W ′h yt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
and
(b) W h and W ′h disagree on any pair that is not voted on in h.
Since ρ is faithful, ρ(W h) isW h-feasible and ρ(W ′h) isW ′h-feasible by Observa-
tion 5. Thus by Observation 1 (appendix B.3, p. 27), we have ρ(W h) = ρ(W ′h)
iff h is terminal. Since ρ is consistent, we may for each non-terminal history
h choose a pair σ(h) := {x, y} ⊆ X that satisfies
(c) x W h y W ′h x and
(d) x W ′′ y iff x ρ(W ′′) y for any tournament W ′′ ⊇W h ∩W ′h.
Claim. Let h = ((xt, yt))Tt=1 6= ∅ be a history such that {x1, y1} = σ(∅)
and
{xt, yt} = σ
(
((xs, ys))t−1s=1
)
for each t ∈ {2, . . . , T}.
Then (i) for any tournament W ′′ with xt W ′′ yt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, we
have xt ρ(W ′′) yt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, and (ii) the pair σ(h) is unranked
by the transitive closure of ⋃Tt=1{(xt, yt)}.
Proof of the claim. For the first part, fix a t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and a tournament
W ′′ such that xs W ′′ ys for each s ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Define h′ := ((xs, ys))t−1s=1
(meaning h′ = ∅ if t = 1), noting that σ(h′) = {xt, yt}. We have W ′′ ⊇
W h′ ∩W ′h′ since W h′ and W ′h′ satisfy (b), whence xt ρ(W ′′) yt by (d).
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For the second part, we have xt ρ(W h) yt and xt ρ(W ′h) yt for every
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} by (a) and the first part of the claim, implying that ρ(W h)
and ρ(W ′h) (being transitive) agree on every pair ranked by the transitive
closure of ⋃Tt=1{(xt, yt)}. Since ρ(W h) and ρ(W ′h) disagree on the pair σ(h)
by (c) and (d), it follows that σ(h) is unranked by the transitive closure. 
By the second part of the claim, σ is a well-defined strategy.56 To show
that it induces ρ, fix a tournament W , and let h = ((xt, yt))Tt=1 be the
terminal history generated by σ and W ; we must demonstrate that ρ(W ) is
the transitive closure of ⋃Tt=1{(xt, yt)}. Since both are rankings, it suffices
to show that xt ρ(W ) yt for every t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. And this follows from the
claim since xt W yt for every t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. 
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